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ABSTRACT 
NATO’s southern flank has been exposed to a wide range of threats and 
challenges from Middle Eastern and North African instability, including terrorism, 
illegal trafficking, and mass migration. Against this backdrop, since 2008, Russia has 
increased its Mediterranean naval activity to levels not observed since the Cold War. 
This thesis investigates the extent to which the perceptions and policies of France, 
Italy, and Spain have shifted in response to Russia’s expanded Mediterranean 
presence. Although its naval presence was once considered a low-priority threat, 
Russia’s recent behavior has led to some significant changes in the perceptions and 
security policies of these Allies. Greater attention to this Mediterranean naval 
challenge has been consistent with the intensification of Russian military 
aggression, and these Allies increasingly share Alliance concerns about Russia’s 
conventional military threat. However, immediate nontraditional security issues 
remain a more urgent priority, a circumstance that limits the extent to which these Allies 
are willing to regard Russia’s naval presence as a threat. While both unilateral and 
multilateral initiatives have been steps toward improving security and stability in 
the Mediterranean, these Allies continue to seek the right set of measures needed to 
address this dynamic environment. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Mediterranean, NATO’s “southern flank,” is a rising strategic vulnerability for 
the Alliance due to emerging challenges from both state and non-state actors. Against this 
backdrop, it has become evident since the 2008 war in Georgia that a resurgent Russia 
seeks to reassert itself as a prominent Mediterranean power. This thesis investigates the 
hypothesis that the perceptions and policies of France, Italy, and Spain have shifted as 
Russia has increased its naval presence in the Mediterranean since 2008.  
This thesis concludes that although its naval presence was once considered a low-
priority threat, Russia’s recent behavior has led to some significant changes in French, 
Italian, and Spanish perceptions and security policies. Greater attention to this 
Mediterranean naval challenge has been consistent with the rising visibility of Russian 
military aggression, and these Allies increasingly share Alliance concerns about Russia’s 
conventional military threat. However, immediate nontraditional security issues remain the 
more urgent priority, a circumstance that limits the extent to which these Allies are willing 
to regard Russia’s naval presence as a threat. While both unilateral and multilateral 
initiatives have been steps toward improving security and stability in the Mediterranean, 
these Allies continue to seek the right set of measures needed to address this dynamic 
environment. 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Given the January 2017 Russian-Syrian agreement to grant Russia a 49-year lease 
for access to the Tartus Naval Base and Russia’s evident intention to maintain a permanent 
naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean, what are the perceptions and policies of 
France, Italy, and Spain on this increased presence? What policy conclusions have they 
drawn? This thesis identifies changes in officially articulated perceptions and policies in 
these countries since 2008 and strives to distinguish developments attributable not only to 
Russia, but also to other factors in the Mediterranean region, including terrorism, failed 
states, religious fanaticism, illegal trafficking, organized crime, and migrant and refugee 
flows. Additionally, this thesis analyzes the extent to which Mediterranean security 
2 
cooperation initiatives assist France, Italy, and Spain in the management of security 
priorities. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The Mediterranean is one of the most economically and geopolitically significant 
regions in the world. As a central hub for international trade that links European, African, 
and Middle Eastern economies, the Mediterranean Sea is the transit route for approximately 
20 percent of the world’s maritime commerce and 30 percent of the world’s oil.1 In short, 
maintaining the safe and free flow of trade through this region is critical for the global 
economy. Moreover, the region is of crucial geopolitical importance because it links many 
nations and institutions in Europe, Africa, and the Levant.  
NATO’s southern flank is a rising strategic vulnerability for the Alliance due to 
emerging challenges, including a rise in terrorist attacks and activity across Europe, 
increased trafficking, substantial flows of migrants and refugees from the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA), and regional conflicts and instability, all of which have created an 
unpredictable security environment and have complicated security policy choices.2 Within 
this environment, Russia has taken steps to reassert itself as a prominent Mediterranean 
power and has increased its Mediterranean naval activity to levels not observed since the 
end of the Cold War. This noticeable increased activity began in 2008 when the Russian 
Navy began regular deployments to the region, eventually establishing a permanent 
Mediterranean presence in 2013.3 
                                                 
1 Alessandro Ungaro, “Un Mediterraneo a 360 Gradi e l’Italia,” Affarinternazionali, last modified 
November 26, 2017, http://www.affarinternazionali.it/2015/11/un-mediterraneo-a-360-gradi-e-litalia/. 
2 Silvia Colombo “The Trajectory of the Crises in the Mediterranean,” as contained in: Alessandro 
Marrone et al., Italy and Security in the Mediterranean, Istituto Affari Internazionali no.24 (Rome, Italy: 
Edizioni Nuova Cultura, 2016), 12–23, http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iairp_24.pdf.  
3 “Formation of Russian Navy Squadron for Operations in Mediterranean Begins—Commander,” 
Russia & CIS General Newswire, Mar 11, 2013, https://search-proquest-
com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/docview/1315940746. 
3 
In 2011, the U.S. government announced an intention to shift its national security 
focus to the Asia-Pacific theater.4 Although this pivot to the Asia-Pacific allowed the 
United States to rebalance and address rising security concerns, the shift provided Russia 
an opportunity to capitalize on what appeared to be a waning U.S. commitment to European 
security. In the years following the nominal U.S. shift away from Europe to the Asia-
Pacific, Russia has taken aggressive actions in Ukraine, conducted provocative military 
activities near European states, and deployed its fleet to the Mediterranean in support of 
military objectives in Syria. In short, Russia’s evident return to the Mediterranean and its 
recent aggressive actions suggest that the Alliance will need to consider response options 
to counter Russia’s escalating aggression. 
Currently, the three Alliance countries along the Mediterranean that retain aircraft 
carriers and maintain a regular naval presence in the Mediterranean are France, Italy, and 
Spain. Some observers have suggested that while the Eastern European Allies have 
continued to perceive Russia as the primary threat to the Alliance, the Mediterranean Allies 
have viewed this threat as exaggerated, and have held that the Alliance should pay greater 
attention to threats emanating from instability in the MENA.5 Vice Admiral Clive 
Johnstone, Commander of the Allied Maritime Command, asserts that Russian naval forces 
are “threatening of our freedoms and of our infrastructure, whether you see them as an 
enemy or not.”6 Clarifying French, Italian, and Spanish perceptions of the prospective 
Russian naval threat will contribute to an informed analysis of the strategic issues in the 
region. Moreover, because of the complex nature and wide range of threats within NATO’s 
southern flank, a deeper understanding of these Allies’ policies, strategies, and objectives 
will show whether and to what extent there are attempts to address Russia’s increased 
                                                 
4 Thomas R. Fedyszyn, “The Russian Navy ‘Rebalances’ to the Mediterranean,” United States Naval 
Institute Proceedings 139, no. 12 (2013): 20–25, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1625806978.  
5 Patrick Keller, “Divided by Geography? NATO’s Internal Debate About the Eastern and Southern 
Flanks” as contained in: Karsten Friis, NATO and Collective Defence in the Twenty-first Century: An 
Assessment of the Warsaw Summit (London, England: Routledge, 2017), 54. 
6 “NATO’s Maritime Moment: A Watershed Year in Alliance Sea Power,” NATO Allied Maritime 
Command, last modified January 17, 2017, https://mc.nato.int/media-centre/news/2017/nato-maritime-
moment-a-watershed-year-in-alliance-sea-power.aspx. 
4 
Mediterranean presence. This may in turn provide insights concerning future challenges 
and prospects for Euro-Atlantic security.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Although many works of scholarship have noted that Russia has increased its naval 
presence in the Mediterranean and is pursuing its strategic interests in the region, few works 
have addressed Russian policy objectives in the Mediterranean. Specifically, there is little 
literature that has comprehensively analyzed Russia’s 2015 update to its maritime doctrine, 
Morskaya Doktrina. The most prominent work is by British analyst Richard Connolly, who 
examined the Russian maritime doctrine and assessed “whether Russia possesses the 
material capabilities to meet the objectives contained within it.”7  
Connolly’s article disputes Michael Kofman’s analysis of the updated doctrine, 
reporting that many of the interpretations Kofman presented in his 2015 article “are not 
stated anywhere in the doctrine.”8 For instance, Kofman describes the doctrine as an 
“incredibly ambitious document with visions of carriers, multirole landing ships, new 
destroyers, and a host of platforms.”9 However, Connolly points out that “no reference to 
specific weapons systems or types of ship is made in the document.”10 Accordingly, 
Connolly’s analysis provides a holistic and well-grounded analysis of Russia’s key 
objectives outlined in the doctrine, one that is less speculative than some other works in its 
final assessments.  
Connolly holds that the updated doctrine signals “the intentions of the Russian 
leadership to maintain a permanent naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean in support 
of wider Russian foreign and security objectives.”11 Indeed, the doctrine explicitly states 
                                                 
7 Richard Connolly, Towards a Dual Fleet? The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation and the 
Modernisation of Russian Naval Capabilities, Research Paper no. 02/17 (Rome: NATO Defense College, 
June 2017), 1, http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1061#. 
8 Connolly, Towards a Dual Fleet?, 1. 
9 Michael Kofman, “The Russian Navy: Strategies and Missions of a Force in Transition,” Center for 
International Maritime Security, last modified November 23, 2015, http://cimsec.org/russian-navy-
strategies-missions-force-transition/20144. 
10 Connolly, Towards a Dual Fleet?, 2. 
11 Connolly, Towards a Dual Fleet?, 2. 
5 
an intention to ensure “a sufficient naval presence of the Russian Federation in the region 
on an ongoing basis.”12 Connolly suggests that Russia’s “renewed assertiveness in the 
Mediterranean is directly related to the annexation of Crimea”13 in 2014 due to the 2015 
revised doctrine’s stated objective to develop the Black Sea Fleet’s infrastructure in Crimea 
and Krasnodar Krai.14  
However, other observers maintain that Russia’s resurgence in the Mediterranean 
began in 2008. Lee Willett, for example, notes that 2008 was a watershed moment for 
Russia’s Mediterranean ambitions and marked the “re-emergence of the use of sea power 
as a strategic tool.”15  
Connolly also notes that financial and shipbuilding constraints indicate that the 
“naval force structure is unlikely to develop how planners originally hoped,” but that most 
objectives within the doctrine “are likely to remain well within reach of Russia’s emerging 
naval force, which looks set to be organized around a larger number of smaller vessels 
equipped with long-range armaments.”16 Ultimately, Connolly concludes that this fact 
“should be a source of concern for NATO given that the priority areas stated in the doctrine 
all lie contiguous to member state borders.”17  
Despite the increased occurrences of Russian aggression, notably in Georgia, 
Ukraine, and Syria, the NATO Allies continue to hold differing perceptions regarding the 
Russian threat. While some Allies consider collective defense and Russia to be the top 
security priority, certain other Allies consider crisis management operations in the greater 
Middle East as more urgent for Euro-Atlantic security. Scholars have yet to adequately 
address the impact of Russia’s increased Mediterranean activity and aggression on the 
                                                 
12 Russian Federation, Morskaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii [Maritime Doctrine of the Russian 
Federation], Moscow, 2015, http://legalacts.ru/doc/morskaja-doktrina-rossiiskoi-federatsii-utv-
prezidentom-rf-26072015/. 
13 Connolly, Towards a Dual Fleet?, 4.  
14 Connolly, Towards a Dual Fleet?, 4. 
15 Lee Willett, “Back to Basics: NATO Navies Operate Across the Spectrum in the Mediterranean,” 
IHS Jane’s Navy International, 121, no. 5 (June, 2016), http://search.proquest.com/docview/1789937572. 
16 Connolly, Towards a Dual Fleet?, 11. 
17 Connolly, Towards a Dual Fleet?, 11. 
6 
southern Allies’ perceptions and policies. Helping to fill in this gap in the literature is one 
of the objectives of this thesis.  
In 2010, Pal Jonson, a Swedish scholar, argued that France, Italy, and Spain are 
among the NATO Allies that could be called “Russia Firsters,” meaning that they “put 
more premiums on nurturing NATO’s relations with Russia than the rest of the Alliance 
and they tend to be more sensitive to how Russia perceives NATO’s deeds.”18 Jonson 
explained that Allies in this group see no need to reinforce Article 5’s credibility by raising 
NATO’s profile along Russia’s borders “since NATO’s collective threat assessment does 
not support this view.”19 Moreover, Jonson noted, the Russia Firsters claim that “an 
increased military presence including the pre-positioning of NATO forces in response to a 
non-threat would just strengthen the revisionist elements of Russia.”20  
Jonson also identified a group that he labeled the “collective defenders.” This group 
consisted primarily of Allies that share borders with Russia; and it included, among others, 
the Baltic states, Norway, and Poland. He described the members of this group as advocates 
of strengthening Article 5 commitment and credibility.21 Additionally, Jonson pointed out, 
despite the fact that these Allies “do not perceive Russia as an immediate threat to their 
security,” the Collective Defenders “tend to note several worrying tendencies in Russia’s 
long-term development.”22 Consequently, Allies in this group assessed that these 
tendencies had generated the need for the Allies to be prepared for this prospective threat. 
Despite Russia’s increased military activity and aggression since the writing of 
Jonson’s paper in 2010, scholars have maintained that the differing perceptions of the 
eastern and southern flanks continue to be a point of contention among the Allies, but that 
some compromises have been formulated. Following the 2016 Warsaw Summit, the 
                                                 
18 Pal Jonson, The Debate About Article 5 and Its Credibility. What Is It All About?, Research Paper 
no. 58 (Rome: NATO Defense College, May 2010), 
http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=195, quoted in David S. Yost, NATO’s Balancing 
Act (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2014), 39. 
19 Jonson, The Debate About Article 5 and Its Credibility, 9. 
20 Jonson, The Debate About Article 5 and Its Credibility, 9. 
21 Jonson, The Debate About Article 5 and Its Credibility, 4. 
22 Jonson, The Debate About Article 5 and Its Credibility, 5. 
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German expert Patrick Keller noted that there was a strong emphasis on bolstering NATO’s 
eastern flank deterrent capabilities, and that this was accompanied by nods to the southern 
Allies “who in times of austerity do not want to assign too many resources to countering a 
threat that they deem imaginary anyway.”23 Keller’s observation implies that the southern 
Allies would not consider Russia’s increased naval presence in the Mediterranean a threat.  
Keller also illustrates the differing threat assessments by pointing out the response 
of the southern Allies to the Enhanced Forward Presence, an initiative along the Eastern 
flank that is comprised of four NATO battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Poland and designed to serve as a NATO tripwire. Keller argues that the East-South 
division is evident in that no southern Allies “proved willing (or able) to serve as 
Framework Nation for one of the four battalions” for NATO’s Enhanced Forward 
Presence.24 He observes that Canada stepped in to lead the framework for one of the four 
battalions instead of one of the southern Allies, and holds that this action “does not bode 
well for intra-European Alliance solidarity.”25  
Keller has also argued that NATO is reluctant to “make a meaningful commitment 
to addressing the challenges in the south.”26 Indeed, scholars have sought to identify the 
reasons why NATO has not played a larger role in the south, and there are two diverging 
perspectives. Judy Dempsey, an analyst with Carnegie Europe, has argued that the Alliance 
is “too divided over what role to play on its Southern flank” and that NATO does not wish 
to become more involved in any conflicts in the South.27 Moreover, she maintains that the 
southern Allies “would like the Alliance to play a more active role” against the 
                                                 
23 Keller, “Divided by Geography?,” 56. 
24 Keller, “Divided by Geography?,” 56. 
25 Keller, “Divided by Geography?,” 56. 
26 Keller, “Divided by Geography?,” 57. 
27 Judy Dempsey, NATO’s Eastern Flank and Its Future Relationship With Russia, CP 318 




Mediterranean challenges and that these Allies judge that NATO “now needs to focus 
exclusively on the south.”28  
Conversely, some scholars suggest that the southern Allies are unenthusiastic about 
an expanded NATO role in the South. Agnieszka Nimark, an analyst with the Barcelona 
Centre for International Affairs, has written that France, Italy, and Spain are reluctant to 
have NATO expand operations in the south because “too much Alliance involvement 
would be unpopular with Muslims and North Africans.”29 Nimark points out that this has 
resulted in an increase in EU-NATO cooperation initiatives, indicating that “NATO is 
expected to support EU efforts to reestablish stability in the south rather than expanding its 
own role.”30  
Although the debate among scholars regarding NATO’s role in the south may seem 
like a new development, expert observers have long discussed Alliance Mediterranean 
initiatives. According to American scholar David Yost, in 1994 NATO’s Mediterranean 
Dialogue “originated in the judgment of some Allies, notably Italy and Spain, that the 
Alliance’s eastward orientation with Partnership for Peace should be complemented with 
greater attention southward.”31  
Lee Willett has argued that NATO’s response to Russia’s increased activity in the 
Mediterranean includes Alliance naval exercises, in which France, Italy, and Spain all 
actively participate.32 However, he does not provide detailed evidence concerning to what 
extent these Allies perceive Russia’s Mediterranean presence as a threat. Other NATO 
Mediterranean initiatives include Operation Sea Guardian and Standing NATO Maritime 
Group 2 (SNMG2). Although the success of these efforts has been debated by scholars, a 
                                                 
28 Dempsey, NATO’s Eastern Flank and Its Future Relationship With Russia. 
29 Agnieszka Nimark, NATO Summit 2016: From Reassurance to Deterrence. What’s Really at Stake?, 
CIDOB 152 (Barcelona, Spain: Barcelona Centre For International Affairs, 2016), 
https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication_series/notes_internacionals/n1_152/nato_summit_2016
_from_reassurance_to_deterrence_what_s_really_at_stake. 
30 Nimark, NATO Summit 2016. 
31 David S. Yost, NATO’s Balancing Act (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 
2014), 204. 
32 Willett, “Back to Basics.” 
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unique objective of this thesis is an analysis of the impact of these Mediterranean initiatives 
on French, Italian, and Spanish perceptions and policies against the backdrop of Russia’s 
Mediterranean naval activity.  
Scholars have often discussed French, Italian, and Spanish perceptions and security 
policies alongside EU Mediterranean initiatives. In like manner, this literature review 
discusses these subjects concurrently. Although the literature that addresses these national 
security policies varies by the author’s theme and focus, there is general agreement among 
scholars that the most urgent security priorities of France, Italy, and Spain are the 
challenges emanating from the MENA. 
French Policy—The literature discussing French perceptions and policies typically 
analyzes themes and trends of French policy in relation to the geostrategic environment. 
Additionally, French analyst Simond de Galbert noted that “France’s foreign policy is hard 
to categorize in classic international relations terms of realism, liberal interventionism, or 
neoconservatism. It may from time to time exhibit some features of each of these 
approaches, but French policymakers rarely view diplomacy and foreign policy through 
such lenses.”33 Consequently, some of the experts discussing French policy often have 
difficulty characterizing French security ambitions.  
Daniel Keohane, an analyst with the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich, 
pointed out that the French White Paper on Defense and National Security of 2013 outlined 
“a considerable level of strategic and operational ambition relative to European 
governments, despite its announcement of cuts to national defense spending.”34 Moreover, 
he explains that security challenges, including Russia’s aggression and the increasing 
instability in the MENA, “put added strain on the country’s defense resources.”35 
                                                 
33 Simond de Galbert, “The Hollande Doctrine: Your Guide to Today’s French Foreign and Security 
Policy,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, last modified September 08, 2015, 
https://www.csis.org/analysis/hollande-doctrine-your-guide-today%E2%80%99s-french-foreign-and-
security-policy. 
34 Daniel Keohane, Defense Choices for the Next French President, no. 206 (Zurich, Switzerland: 
Center for Security Studies, 2017), 1, http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-
interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse206-EN.pdf. 
35 Keohane, Defense Choices for the Next French President, 2. 
10 
Keohane’s analysis suggests that, despite France’s level of ambition, budget constraints 
may influence French security priorities and the extent to which France is willing to address 
specific security concerns. 
In an analysis of the 2017 French Strategic Review on Defence and National 
Security, French commentator Boris Toucas assesses that France’s fight against terrorism 
“will continue to absorb a significant portion of France’s defense resources.”36 
Additionally, he argues that French policy “needs more than a defensive posture. In its 
immediate neighborhood, France must be able to overcome any crisis and maintain 
superiority over any non-state actor to protect its citizens and economic interests.”37  
In recent years, scholars have argued that France needs to do more to assert its 
leadership role not only in Europe but also the world. Toucas’ argument reflects this view, 
and he suggests that “the European Union is not and cannot be the only horizon of French 
diplomacy...Because France has limited reach, and because the European Union is mostly 
focused on its geographic neighborhood, France must engage in more strategic partnerships 
in Africa, the Middle East…and beyond.”38 Accordingly, Toucas suggests that EU 
Mediterranean initiatives provide France with assistance in the management of its security 
priorities, which allows France to be strategically assertive, but that France has yet to take 
full advantage of this opportunity. 
In April 2017, the French analyst Tatiana Kastouéva-Jean discussed France’s 
Russia policy and security challenges facing the next French president. She argued that 
France is facing a choice between “maintaining the current line, which combines firmness 
and dialogue, and rapprochement with Moscow, which would entail softening” or lifting 
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sanctions on Moscow.39 Moreover, she argues that French policy is anchored to NATO 
and the EU and that the next President will need to decide “whether to prioritize Franco-
Russian relations at the expense of existing Alliances.”40 Her argument is representative of 
current scholarly efforts to discern how France perceives a resurgent Russia. 
Italian Policy—The literature on Italian policy primarily discusses the security 
challenges that Italy faces as a result of the instability in the MENA. Italian scholars 
Alessandro Marrone and Vincenzo Camporini wrote in 2016 that Matteo Renzi, then the 
Italian Prime Minister, was seeking to “redirect Italy’s military engagement abroad toward 
the Mediterranean region” in response to the growing instability within that region.41 
Moreover, they argued that the Renzi government had “stepped up its efforts in favor of 
greater European cooperation and integration in the defense field.”42  
Scholars have noted that Italy’s shift to managing regional instability has produced 
new challenges for the Italian government. Marrone and others have pointed out that one 
of the challenges resulting from the migration crisis “has been to manage the complexity 
of these operations and ensure efficient coordination between the various organizations and 
personnel being managed by state bodies and agencies.”43  
There is general agreement among scholars on Italian perceptions and policies 
regarding Russia. This literature follows Jonson’s “Russia Firsters” argument and 
emphasizes an Italian government striving for better relations with Moscow through 
increased dialogue. Georgian analyst Nona Mikhelidze has argued that “Rome believes 
                                                 
39 Tatiana Kastouéva-Jean, “France’s Russia Policy: Between Bilateral Relations and Alliances,” as 
contained in: Thomas Gomart et al., Foreign Policy Challenges for the Next French President (Paris, 
France: Institut Français Des Relations Internationals, April 2017), 43, 
https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ifri_foreign_policy_challenges_next_french_president_2
017.pdf. 
40 Kastouéva-Jean, “France’s Russia Policy: Between Bilateral Relations and Alliances,” 44. 
41 Alessandro Marrone and Vincenzo Camporini, Recent Developments in Italy’s Security and Defence 
Policy, IAI 16/19 (Rome, Italy: Instituto Affari Internazionali, 2016), 5, 
http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iai1619.pdf. 
42 Marrone, Recent Developments in Italy’s Security and Defence Policy, 5. 
43 Alessandro Marrone, Michele Nones and Alessandro R. Ungaro, “Italian Defence Policy, Armed 
Forces and Operations in the Mediterranean,” as contained in: Marrone, Italy and Security in the 
Mediterranean, 118. 
12 
that including Moscow in all dialogues on international affairs is the best way to ensure 
long-term security on the continent” and that Italy considers Russia central to the European 
security order.44 Moreover, she argues that a positive bilateral relationship between the two 
states “persists despite Russia’s intervention in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea.”45  
However, this interpretation also notes that Italy is committed to upholding Western 
policy toward Russia. Specifically, this argument stresses that, despite Italian desires to 
maintain dialogue with Russia, Italy remains firmly committed to NATO deterrence and 
defense policies. Marrone points out that concerning NATO, “Italy has strongly supported 
reassurance, deterrence, and defense measures decided in 2014 in light of Russia’s 
aggressive posture.”46 Thus, although Italy has maintained positive relations with Russia, 
scholars consider Italy committed to NATO’s principle of collective defense. This 
argument recognizes that Italy and its fellow Allies have strengthened NATO policy in 
response to Russian aggression. 
Spanish Policy—Two perspectives stand out in the literature regarding Spanish 
defense policy. The first argument is that Spain is lagging in its contributions to Euro-
Atlantic security. Dempsey holds that “Madrid, if it wished, could play a much stronger 
role in the resolution of the refugee crisis, Eurozone reform, or the security of sub-Saharan 
Africa,” but, as a result of Spain’s recent economic, territorial, and political crises, it “is 
definitely underperforming in the European and international arenas.”47 Spanish analyst 
José Torreblanca has advanced a similar argument. He considers the Spanish government 
far removed from the international arena. He illustrates this argument by describing the 
Spanish government’s reaction to the immigration crisis as “completely disconnected from 
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the affair” compared to the European counterparts that remain deeply engaged such as Italy 
and Greece.48  
The second argument regarding Spanish defense policy is that Spain is playing a 
key role in Euro-Atlantic security. Aurora Mejía, the Deputy Director General for Security 
for the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, argued in 2017 that despite 
Spain’s small defense budget, the country is making significant contributions to Euro-
Atlantic security. Her argument notes that the government has strongly supported NATO 
and EU initiatives, and has increased its defense spending by 32 percent from 2016 to 2017. 
Moreover, Spain is “the leading contributor to Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) military operations, as it is the only EU country that has participated in all the 
operations to date.”49  
The scholars discussing Spanish policy generally agree that Spain is maintaining a 
balancing act regarding Russia. Francisco de Borja Lasheras, a Spanish policy analyst, has 
written that Spain’s policy toward Russia “necessitates that it performs a balancing act 
between de-escalation and détente with Moscow, on one hand…and Allied assurance in 
NATO on the other.”50 He notes that this approach has produced a “pendular foreign 
policy” that has been apparent in Spain’s participation “in common security frameworks 
while also trying to avoid what officials in Madrid perceive as the risk of isolating Russia 
and overlooking its role in key dossiers, such as Syria and Ukraine.”51 At the same time, 
he observes, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has “led Spain to scale down its view of Russia 
as a potential strategic partner.”52 This analysis implies that there may be indications of 
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shifting Spanish perceptions regarding Russia, but that Spanish policy may also overlook 
Russia’s increased Mediterranean activity. 
Antonio Andrés, an analyst with the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, has 
made a similar argument by pointing out that Spain’s “position seems to swing between a 
desire to prompt dialogue with Moscow and a fear of appearing to be a belligerent 
partner.”53 However, Andrés also argues that the Spanish government perceived that 
Russia had legitimate interests regarding Ukraine and that these interests “must be 
considered in any attempt to resolve the Ukrainian conflict sponsored by the EU.”54 In 
short, these studies raise the possibility that Spain has not revised its perceptions or policies 
regarding Russia’s increased Mediterranean activity, but has reluctantly taken a harder 
stance toward Russia when pressured to do so by fellow members of NATO or the EU. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis investigates three possible hypotheses concerning the perceptions and 
policies of France, Italy, and Spain as Russia has increased its naval presence in the 
Mediterranean since 2008.  
First, it is possible that there has been no significant change in the perceptions or 
policies of these Allies. Accordingly, they may not perceive Russia’s increased naval 
presence as an immediate threat and therefore other security concerns, including migration 
and terrorism, may remain the focus of attention in the security policies of these Allies. In 
other words, although these southern Allies may perceive Russia’s provocative military 
activities in Ukraine and Syria as a potential threat for the eastern Allies and ultimately the 
Alliance as a whole, these southern Allies do not perceive Russia’s expanded 
Mediterranean presence as an immediate security concern to be addressed in redefined 
policies.  
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The second, and the most likely, hypothesis is that there have been minor shifts in 
the perceptions and policies of these Allies. Despite shifts in French, Italian, and Spanish 
perceptions to consider Russia’s Mediterranean naval presence as an increasingly 
significant potential threat, these Allies may continue to exhibit reservations about 
regarding this presence as a threat, at least in any publicly articulated policy. These 
reservations may stem from various factors, including domestic politics, sensitivities to 
Russia’s perceptions of policy shifts, desires to maintain positive relations with Russia, or 
an insufficient ability to rebalance security priorities. Similarly, these Allies may regard 
Russia’s increased naval presence in the Mediterranean as a potential threat, but security 
issues emanating from the Middle East and North Africa continue to take a much higher 
precedence because these issues are perceived as more immediate security concerns. 
Consequently, these Allies may not consider Russia’s naval presence as a threat to be met 
on a national basis, but instead as a threat that necessitates combined actions through 
multilateral frameworks. 
The third hypothesis, and the least likely, is that the perceptions and policies of 
these Allies may have had a major shift and that they now regard Russia’s naval presence 
as a high priority threat. This hypothesis considers that, as a result of Russia’s increased 
aggression in Ukraine and Syria, these Allies have had a major shift in perspective and 
consider Russia’s Mediterranean presence as an immediate security concern. 
Consequently, these Allies have made major policy shifts to address the Russian 
Mediterranean threat on a national basis and through multilateral initiatives.  
It is most likely, however, that each country regards the threat differently, and each 
could fall into its own category within this spectrum of hypotheses. The geostrategic 
circumstances of France, Italy, and Spain expose each country to similar security concerns, 
and this increases the likelihood that these Allies will have approximately similar 
perceptions regarding Russia’s naval presence. Despite exposure to similar security issues, 
factors such as domestic political dynamics, historical episodes, or bilateral political 
relations with Russia may influence the degree to which these Allies are willing to regard 
Russia’s increased naval presence as a threat.  
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E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research design for this thesis is primarily qualitative. Through a qualitative 
analysis of events, this thesis identifies historical trends of Soviet naval activities in the 
Mediterranean, and these are compared to Russia’s Mediterranean activities from 1991 to 
2016. This analysis identifies historical factors that enabled the Soviets to maintain a 
permanent naval presence and determines which of these factors have had continued 
impacts on Russia’s ability to meet its current Mediterranean objectives.  
Against this background, the perceptions and policies of France, Italy, and Spain 
are examined to provide indications of these Allies’ security concerns and how they 
manage security priorities. A deeper understanding of these Allies’ policies and 
perceptions determines whether and to what extent there have been attempts to address 
Russia’s increased Mediterranean presence. Although this thesis mainly focuses on 
perceptions and policies regarding Russia’s increased presence, it also explores perceptions 
and policies regarding other security factors in the Mediterranean region (including 
terrorism, organized crime, and migrant and refugee flows). Through this analysis it has 
been possible to determine if shifts in perceptions and policies are attributable to Russia’s 
increased naval presence or to other security concerns. Moreover, by examining 
Mediterranean security cooperation initiatives, one can assess the extent to which these 
initiatives assist France, Italy, and Spain in the management of security priorities.  
Government publications and transcripts of official policy statements from France, 
Italy, and Spain are utilized to understand the security concerns of these Allies and to 
discern shifts in security priorities. These documents, translated into English when no 
English-language primary sources are available, are the primary sources of this study. 
Mainstream media articles, press releases, and speeches by government leaders are relied 
upon to understand security perceptions and to indicate shifts in threat perceptions not 
evident in governmental policy documents. These sources are also used to examine French, 
Italian, and Spanish responses to significant events that affect national security. 
Additionally, scholarly publications and non-governmental organization publications are 
utilized to frame the security environment in the Mediterranean region and to provide 
additional insight into the perceptions and policies of France, Italy, and Spain. Ultimately, 
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all of the aforementioned sources are drawn upon to determine current and future 
challenges for Mediterranean security.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW  
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II provides a brief historical 
background of Soviet naval activity in the Mediterranean from Stalin up until the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the formal dissolution of its Mediterranean fleet in 1991. 
Additionally, the chapter analyzes Russia’s naval activities and Mediterranean policies 
from 1991 to 2017, and the factors contributing to Russia’s ability to maintain a permanent 
naval presence in the region. 
Chapter III analyzes the perceptions and policies of France, Italy, and Spain. This 
chapter analyzes these Allies’ policies, strategies, and objectives in the Mediterranean in 
order to determine the security priorities of each country and to understand the approaches 
of these Allies to address security concerns. Additionally, this chapter clarifies French, 
Italian, and Spanish perceptions of the prospective Russian naval threat and examines 
whether and to what extent they have attempted to address Russia’s increased 
Mediterranean presence. This analysis includes an examination of bilateral relations 
between these Allies and Russia. 
Chapter IV explores French, Italian, and Spanish activities within joint 
Mediterranean initiatives. This chapter assesses the extent to which these initiatives assist 
these Allies in the management of security priorities. Additionally, this chapter identifies 
how these initiatives shape French, Italian, and Spanish perceptions and policies. 
Chapter V describes the prospects and challenges faced by these Allies and Russia. 
This chapter explores the current state of Mediterranean security and analyzes Russia’s 
future Mediterranean activity, recent developments for France, Italy, and Spain, and 
prospects for NATO and EU multilateral initiatives. 
Chapter VI summarizes the main findings and presents conclusions.  
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II. RUSSIA IN THE MEDITERRANEAN—THE PURSUIT 
OF A PERMANENT PRESENCE 
Although Russia’s Mediterranean activities gained prominence around 2008 in 
conjunction with Moscow’s violent intervention in Georgia, steps to establish a permanent 
post-Soviet naval presence in the region were taken well before then. In fact, the foundation 
of Russia’s ongoing Mediterranean activity rests to a great extent on steps taken throughout 
its Soviet history. It was during this time that a Mediterranean presence became a policy 
objective that was central to Soviet power projection and countering the West. Despite 
several obstacles, the Soviet Union managed to develop a permanent Mediterranean naval 
presence that further strengthened its capacity to protect and advance its security interests.  
While the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 had a severe impact on both its fleet 
and its Mediterranean presence, Russia has since demonstrated that the Mediterranean 
remains a key area of interest. Russia’s initial post-1991 Mediterranean ambitions aimed 
at reestablishing a permanent naval presence capable of projecting power and protecting 
Moscow’s regional interests. Establishing this presence was the first step toward meeting 
Russia’s wider objectives in the region, and it symbolized the revival of Russian power. 
As Russia has advanced its strategic position in the Mediterranean, NATO forces have 
faced a new security landscape in the south that is highlighted by an increasingly active 
and aggressive Russian military. The Alliance, therefore, must recognize that the Russian 
threat is not limited to its eastern flank, but concerns its southern flank as well. 
A. SOVIETS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 
The Mediterranean Sea’s link to Russian power projection can be directly observed 
in Stalin’s post-1945 policy. Although Stalin did not place a high priority on the region, 
some assessments were made. Carey Joynt and Oles Smolansky have noted that military-
strategic considerations were revealed by the Soviet “attempts to improve Russia’s 
strategic position by acquiring or effectively controlling the Turkish Straits area and to 
strengthen that position through the acquisition of the DoDecanese Islands and 
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Tripolitania.”55 Moreover, they point out that control of these positions would have both 
“established the U.S.S.R. as a Mediterranean power” and “reinforced Stalin’s demands for 
the control of the Straits area.”56 Despite Soviet attempts to secure these locations, Stalin 
ultimately limited his pursuit of influence in the region in order to avoid provoking Western 
powers.57 Consequently, even though Stalin was unable to establish any type of continuous 
Mediterranean naval presence, his objectives demonstrate the early emphasis placed on the 
Mediterranean for Soviet power projection.  
Developments at the onset of the Cold War advanced Soviet desires to establish a 
permanent presence in the Mediterranean. By the end of the 1940s, Western powers had 
taken a number of steps to strengthen their security including the creation of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949 and, in the southern flank, the establishment of the 
U.S. Sixth Fleet as a permanent naval presence.58 With these developments also came the 
power of the U.S. nuclear arsenal that further increased Soviet desires to neutralize what 
Moscow regarded as a growing Western threat. Despite these concerns, the Soviet Union 
was limited in its ability to respond, notably in the naval domain. 
Throughout the early stages of the Cold War the Soviets mainly employed a coastal 
defense naval force, and it took several years to develop extended naval competences. It 
was not until 1958 that the U.S.S.R.’s naval forces could complete their first extended 
deployment to the Mediterranean and, even then, the Soviet Union remained limited by its 
logistic capabilities.59 By 1964, despite the Soviet Navy’s relative inexperience and 
logistical shortcomings, Soviet warships managed to establish a continuous presence in the 
Mediterranean.60 This Soviet Mediterranean operational squadron was called the 5th 
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Eskadra, or the Fifth Mediterranean squadron, and its mission was to locate and track the 
U.S. Sixth Fleet naval forces. However, the Soviet force still lacked the support facilities 
needed to maintain extended deployments, and this continued to constrain Soviet naval 
operations. 
It is important to note that Khrushchev had secured naval bases in Albania in the 
mid-1950s, which enhanced the Soviet Navy’s ability to conduct Mediterranean 
operations. However, this agreement was short-lived. Although the bases did not represent 
a major boost to the Soviet Navy’s presence, they did provide the fleet with more 
opportunities to gain experience in the region. Moreover, the Albanian experience allowed 
the Soviet force to demonstrate its power, and it conducted its first major exercise in 
September 1960, totaling around twenty Soviet vessels in the Aegean Sea.61 The Albania 
bases proved adequate to support the growth of the limited Soviet presence in the region, 
but the Soviet Union was unable to maintain this strategically important relationship. The 
Sino-Soviet dispute led to Albania cancelling the arrangement in 1961, leading the Soviet 
Union to withdraw all of its forces from the Mediterranean.62 As a result, Khrushchev 
sought alternative options to support a Soviet naval presence in the region. 
Khrushchev took steps toward establishing a strategic foothold in the region by 
cultivating relationships with Middle Eastern and North African states along the 
Mediterranean. At this time, in the early 1960s, U.S. relations with Egypt and Syria were 
deteriorating and in response Khrushchev intended to fill this widening gap. Joynt and 
Smolansky explain that “in a classical application of zero-sum game theory, the decrease 
of Western influence was believed to be accompanied by a corresponding growth of Soviet 
influence.”63 This growing influence was strikingly apparent when Khrushchev made a 
visit to Egypt in May 1964. American analyst George Dragnich points out that this visit 
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“reflected a major Soviet attempt to increase the USSR’s influence there and in the region 
as a whole.”64 Moreover, Dragnich emphasizes that while in Egypt, Khrushchev “portrayed 
the U.S. naval presence in the Mediterranean as a threat to the region itself…By 
characterizing Western naval forces as a common adversary, the Soviets may have been 
trying to gain Arab acceptance of a permanent naval [Soviet] presence in the 
Mediterranean.”65 Although improved relations with Egypt and other Arab states were a 
positive development for the expansion of Soviet influence in the region, Khrushchev 
failed to obtain any agreements for a Mediterranean naval facility, which was necessary 
for providing logistical support to a permanent Soviet naval presence.  
Owing largely to Soviet support to the Arabs during the 1967 Six-Day War, it was 
under Brezhnev that the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean expanded 
substantially. As American defense analyst Gordon McCormick points out, following that 
war the Soviet Navy gained access to Egyptian and Syrian naval facilities and by 1969 
“Soviet naval units were operating regularly out of the Egyptian ports of Alexandria, Mersa 
Matruh, and Port Said, and the Syrian port of Latakia.”66 Moreover, he explains that this 
move led to an increased Soviet naval presence because “at the center of these activities 
was the Soviet naval complex at Alexandria which, by late 1970, featured a command 
center, extensive ship repair works, storage facilities, and a permanent Soviet presence 
ashore.”67 In short, these facilities and the logistical support units significantly enhanced 
the Soviet Union’s ability to sustain a permanent naval presence in the Mediterranean. 
Support from these assets facilitated the expansion of Soviet naval operations, and 
as they expanded, so did aggression in Mediterranean waters. Above all, however, the 
Jordan Crisis in 1970 and the 1973 October War resulted in a surge of Soviet naval vessels 
in the region that was accompanied by subsequent episodes of aggression. McCormick 
                                                 
64 Dragnich, The Soviet Union’s Quest for Access to Naval Facilities in Egypt Prior to the June War of 
1967, 26. 
65 Dragnich, The Soviet Union’s Quest for Access to Naval Facilities in Egypt Prior to the June War of 
1967, 26–27. 
66 McCormick, The Soviet Presence in the Mediterranean, 10. 
67 McCormick, The Soviet Presence in the Mediterranean, 10. 
23 
explains that during this crisis “the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean expanded 
from a low force level of less than 55 ships prior to the conflict, to a post crisis high of 
between 94–98 warships and auxiliaries.”68 Moreover, McCormick highlights intensified 
Soviet aggressive activities during the October War including, among other actions, “the 
first unambiguous case in which Soviet forces engaged in active anti-carrier simulations 
against U.S. forces involved in crisis operations… directing fire-control radar at nearby 
ships, and carrying out a range of pre-combat maneuvers against U.S. surface units.”69  
During this period, from 1971 to 1974, Brezhnev vocally opposed the U.S. naval 
presence in the Mediterranean. In 1971, against the backdrop of the SALT negotiations 
concerning nuclear delivery systems, the Soviets pushed to include limitations on forward 
based systems. As Calhoun and Petersen observe, “General Secretary Brezhnev stated the 
U.S.S.R. was willing ‘to discuss any proposals’ concerning measures to terminate the less 
than ‘ideal situation when navies of the great powers are cruising about for long periods 
far from their own shores.’”70 Although the Soviets were persuaded to exclude the issue 
for inclusion in the SALT I agreement, Brezhnev continued his campaign by making a 
public call for naval limitations for forward-based nuclear delivery systems in the 
Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. In July 1974, in a speech delivered to the Polish 
government, Brezhnev called for the “withdrawal of ships carrying nuclear weapons” in 
the Mediterranean.71 While Brezhnev’s calls had no impact on U.S. naval deployments to 
the Sixth Fleet, they demonstrated the diplomatic steps the Soviets were willing to take to 
reduce the nuclear role of the U.S. Navy in its proximity. 
At the same time, however, relations between Moscow and Cairo began to break 
down, eventually leading to the restriction of Soviet access to Egyptian port facilities. The 
tension began in 1971 and was spurred by disagreements over arms deliveries that in 1972 
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led to President Sadat ordering the withdrawal of the Soviet air defense elements and Soviet 
advisers to the Egyptian military.72 Although this had no immediate impact on the Soviet 
activities in Egyptian ports, it signaled the potential consequences of further Soviet-
Egyptian disagreements.  
The U.S.S.R.’s relations with Egypt continued to deteriorate following the October 
War. American analyst Robert Weinland explains that “Egypt was dissatisfied with Soviet 
performance during the war,” and a series of postwar disputes compounded that 
dissatisfaction.73 As a result, Egypt gradually restricted Soviet access to Egyptian port 
facilities and by 1975 the Soviets lost access to Mersa Mertuh, Sollum, and Port Said.74 
Moreover, Weinland points out that by June 1975 Egypt was taking steps to court the 
United States. This was evident in Cairo “including the United States but not the Soviet 
Union in the opening ceremonies” of the reopening of the Suez Canal.75 Finally, in March 
1976, a further disagreement resulted in Sadat revoking the 1971 Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation with Moscow, giving the Soviet Union one month to close down its operations 
and remove its units from Alexandria.76 
Despite losing access to the Egyptian ports, Moscow cultivated relations with other 
countries along the Mediterranean. These relations provided Soviet naval forces with 
access to shore-based support facilities, which enabled the Soviets to maintain a permanent 
naval presence in the Mediterranean. Perhaps because the Soviets recognized that the 
curtailment of access to Egypt’s facilities required substitute facilities, Moscow pursued 
improved relations with other Mediterranean countries. Although the Soviet Union shifted 
its operations to the Syrian ports Tartus and Latakia, McCormick notes that the Syrians 
were “reluctant to allow the Soviet Navy to establish a permanent presence ashore. While 
the squadron was permitted to service its needs with harbor-based auxiliaries, it was not 
                                                 
72 Weinland, “Egypt and Support for the Mediterranean Squadron,” 268. 
73 Weinland, “Egypt and Support for the Mediterranean Squadron,” 269. 
74 McCormick, The Soviet Presence in the Mediterranean, 13. 
75 Weinland, “Egypt and Support for the Mediterranean Squadron,” 270. 
76 Weinland, “Egypt and Support for the Mediterranean Squadron,” 270; and McCormick, The Soviet 
Presence in the Mediterranean, 13. 
25 
allowed to develop Soviet-controlled command, storage, or repair assets on Syrian soil.”77 
Additionally, the Syrian ports “proved to be a poor substitute for the loss of Egyptian 
facilities” as they were “small, congested, and poorly equipped.” The Syrian ports, though 
not ideal, became the new Soviet hub for operations as Moscow sought access to other 
facilities to support its Mediterranean squadron. Accordingly, the Soviets increased visits 
to Algeria and Libya, eventually signing agreements with Libya to use the Tobruk and 
Bardia naval facilities. Moscow also concluded an accord with Yugoslavia to use the Tivat 
facility.78 Additionally, the Soviets gained their first access to facilities in the western 
Mediterranean by making arrangements with Morocco and Tunisia to access their 
facilities.79 
Although the use of additional facilities allowed the Soviets to maintain their 
permanent naval presence in the Mediterranean, the loss of access to Egypt had a noticeable 
impact on Soviet operations. In 1973, the Soviet naval presence peaked with an average 
daily strength of 56 warships and support vessels active in the Mediterranean, but by 1977 
and for many of the following years, the average daily strength fell to 45 warships and 
auxiliaries.80 However, as McCormick points out, “while this has arguably had a serious 
effect on the Squadron’s future combat effectiveness, it has not obviously reduced its value 
as an instrument and symbol of Soviet interests and presence.”81  
Although the Soviet naval squadron in the Mediterranean remained operationally 
constrained throughout the 1980s, it remained active in the Mediterranean. Bosnia and 
Herzegovinan scholar Milan Vego comments that during the 1980s “the principal activities 
of the 5th Eskadra’s surface combatants, other than conducting good-will visits to 
Mediterranean ports, included gatekeeping at choke points and the surveillance of U.S. and 
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NATO surface ships.”82 McCormick highlights that Soviet naval forces indirectly 
supported Libya in 1985–86 against U.S. naval and air operations in the Gulf of Sidra by 
taking “position in the vicinity of U.S. carriers operating off Libyan waters to receive 
timely warning of any U.S. attack,” relaying this information to Libyan authorities.83 
Moreover, McCormick asserts that the Soviets were “willing to become involved in these 
efforts where their assistance can be plausibly denied and carried out with a minimal degree 
of exposure.”84 In short, the Soviet Union remained committed to the position of 
undermining the United States in the region, through a variety of means. 
Under Gorbachev, who took office as General Secretary of the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union in 1985, the Soviet Navy continued operations in the Mediterranean, 
but gradually relaxed its stance toward the United States until the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991. Vego notes that overall, during the final years of the Soviet Union, 
“Moscow’s policies toward the Middle East and the Mediterranean sought to promote 
Soviet objectives without alienating the United States.”85 This was evident in both the 
reduced Soviet support for Libya and Syria and the increased cooperation with the United 
States in 1990–1991 in opposing Iraqi aggression.86 In 1990, the daily naval strength 
averaged 30 ships, and by May 1991 the 5th Eskadra had been formally disbanded.87 Thus, 
ended Soviet naval activity in the Mediterranean. 
B. RUSSIA’S MEDITERRANEAN RISE 
Although the Mediterranean remained key to Russian power projection in the 
1990s, the Russian Navy was in a severe state of decline, and President Boris Yeltsin took 
few steps toward a return to the region. American scholar Mikhail Tsypkin, an expert on 
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Russia, highlights that the navy “was cut rapidly and brutally in the 1990s…there [was] 
not enough money for operations, maintenance and training,” and the entire future of the 
navy was in question.88 While this state of the navy was a major limitation to a Russian 
deployment to the Mediterranean, another contributing factor was the fact that Yeltsin 
showed little inclination to utilize the naval forces in any type of foreign policy role. 
Tyspkin points out that “Yeltsin failed to provide the navy with firm guidance regarding 
Russia’s place in the world” and that he “did not push energetically for the reform of the 
armed forces.”89 This detachment from the navy suggests that Yeltsin had little ambition 
to employ the navy beyond the Russian periphery.  
However, the funding cuts and Yeltsin’s lack of direction did not entirely eliminate 
the navy’s role in Russian foreign policy. Fiona Hill, an American analyst, notes that in the 
early 1990s there was a “consensus in the Russian political elite about the importance of 
restoring Russia’s international position.”90 Against the backdrop of the 1995 conflict in 
Bosnia, Andrei Kokoshin, then the First Deputy Minister of Defense, offered a path 
forward: “Do not forget that the navy also is a special state instrument by which not only 
purely military, but also political missions are accomplished. I have in mind the showing 
of the Russian flag.”91 Accordingly, in December 1995, the Russian aircraft carrier Admiral 
Kuznetsov and its battle group deployed to the Mediterranean with several intentions, 
including showing the Russian flag, and expressing solidarity with the Bosnian Serbs, and 
celebrating the 300th anniversary of the Russian Navy.92  
Another motivating factor behind this deployment was to demonstrate that Russia 
was still a major European player on an equal footing with the West. In January 1996, the 
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Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yevgeny Primakov, stated that “Russia was and 
remains a Great Power…[and] her foreign policy should correspond to that status.”93 To 
prove this status, during the December 1995 deployment the Russian flotilla 
conducted exercises with the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.94 In May 1996, 
Russian Naval Captain Vladimir Maryukha noted that the deployment “announced the 
Russian ships’ return to an area of their influence” and that what Americans saw was “not 
Russian sailors bowed by poverty, but sailors who are not only as good as, but sometimes 
better than those from rich America.”95 While this deployment did not signal an 
imminent return to the region, it demonstrated that the Russian Navy was still an 
essential instrument for Moscow. Above all, the 1995 deployment showed the 
enduring perceived link between the Mediterranean and Russian power projection.  
Constrained by budget issues and resources, the Russian Navy did not deploy to the 
Mediterranean again during the 1990s. However, some of Yeltsin’s foreign engagements 
continued advancing Russia’s Mediterranean prospects. In 1997, against the backdrop of 
pressure in the Duma to gain territorial concessions in Crimea, Yeltsin pursued an 
agreement with Ukraine that allowed Russia to station its Black Sea Fleet at the Sevastopol 
port facility for twenty years.96 Although this agreement had no immediate impact on 
Russia’s Mediterranean activity, it was nonetheless a positive development for the fleet 
because it provided easy and continual access to the Mediterranean. By 1999, despite 
indications that Russia was preparing to deploy warships to the Mediterranean during the 
crisis in Yugoslavia, Moscow did not deliver the final order and limited the deployment to 
a single submarine, the K-141 Kursk.97 Apart from the precarious state of the navy, this 
was likely because Russia understood that its naval forces were hardly a credible option to 
93 Hill, “Russian Policy in the Caspian Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean,” 24–25. 
94 Pilling and Connell, “Waltzing with the Russian Bear,” 61–63. 
95 Pilling and Connell, “Waltzing with the Russian Bear,” 61–63. 
96 Robert H. Donaldson, “Boris Yeltsin’s Foreign Policy Legacy,” Tulsa Journal of Comparative and 
International Law 7, no. 2 (1999): 303. https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tjcil/vol7/iss2/2.  
97 Antony Preston, “Russian Navy Reported 'Ready to Modernize',” Sea Power 42, no. 11 (November 
1999): 29, https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/docview/235954329; Tsypkin, Rudderless in a 
Storm, 8. 
29 
influence NATO. As Tsypkin points out, the NATO operation in Yugoslavia left Russia 
with the realization that it “had no instrument for influencing NATO…NATO was not 
going to take Russia’s diminished conventional forces into consideration.”98 Perhaps 
because of this realization, Russia looked to implement measures that would reorient the 
future of its navy.  
The Russian Navy’s reorientation came in the form of an updated maritime doctrine 
in 2001. The doctrine not only revealed Russia’s naval objectives and plans to develop its 
fleet but also Moscow’s new priorities for the Mediterranean. Specifically, the doctrine 
emphasized “a course focused on turning it into a zone of military-political stability and 
good neighborly relations” and ensuring a “sufficient naval presence of the Russian 
Federation in the region.”99 A major contributing factor to this increased attention to the 
Mediterranean began two years prior to the doctrine’s publication after Vladimir Putin, 
then the Russian Prime Minister, pushed for a Russian presence in the Mediterranean. 
Indeed, analysts Derek Letterbeck and Georgij Engelbrecht note that “the initial decision 
to re-establish a Russian military presence in the Mediterranean was announced by 
Vladimir Putin during his brief stint as Prime Minister in 1999.”100 Consequently, the 
written policy articulated Russia’s intent to reestablish itself as a significant Mediterranean 
power. 
However, the Russian Navy was hardly in a state to achieve this aim or any of the 
objectives outlined in the 2001 doctrine. British analyst Richard Connolly explains that 
“unfavorable economic conditions of the early 2000s…along with the neglect of the fleet 
in the 1990s after the dramatic reduction in military spending that accompanied economic 
reform, left the Russian fleet in a parlous state, and ill-equipped to meet the ambitions 
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contained in the doctrine.”101 This state of the fleet, resource constraints, and other factors 
(including the accidental sinking of the Kursk submarine) contributed to the cancellation 
of at least two planned Mediterranean deployments in 2000 and 2002.102 In short, despite 
its declared ambitions, Russia was unable to support a permanent Mediterranean naval 
force in the early 2000s, and it would need to overcome several obstacles to achieve this 
goal. 
In the following years, President Putin began leveraging diplomatic opportunities 
to both repair Russia’s reputation in the eastern Mediterranean and to lay the foundation 
for Russia’s prospective return to the Mediterranean. Following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, Moscow lost key naval partnerships with nearly all of the Mediterranean states. 
However, Russia retained its logistical facility at Syria’s Tartus naval base; and in 2005, 
Russia agreed to write off 73 percent of Syria’s $13.4 billion Soviet-era debt in exchange 
for continued Russian access to Syria’s Tartus and Latakia port facility.103 This exchange 
was a significant development as it extended Moscow’s reach by securing a foothold in the 
region and it showed Putin’s dedication toward his previously stated goal to establish a 
permanent presence in the Mediterranean. At the same time, Russia sought to repair 
relations with Algeria, Egypt, and Libya. Between 2006 and 2008, Putin paid state visits 
to these countries with an agenda that included cancellations of Soviet-era debts and 
prospective cooperation initiatives in military and energy sectors.104 The importance of 
these visits is that they marked the first visits of a Russian President since the collapse of 
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the Soviet Union.105 Above all, however, the visits showed Russia’s commitment to 
expanding its influence and becoming a major Mediterranean power. 
As Putin repaired Russia’s relations with countries along the eastern and southern 
Mediterranean, there were indications that the readiness of Russia’s fleet had moderately 
improved, at least enough to resume small-scale activities in the Mediterranean. This was 
demonstrated by Russia’s willingness and ability to send warships to the Mediterranean in 
support of NATO operations. In 2004, Russia offered to contribute to NATO’s Operation 
Active Endeavour, an Article 5 counter-terrorism operation in the Mediterranean. 
Accordingly, Russia briefly contributed a frigate to the operation in 2006 and again in 
2007.106 Russia’s aggression against Georgia in 2008, however, led NATO to suspend the 
cooperation.107  
Further indications of Russian intentions to establish a permanent presence in the 
Mediterranean emerged in the form of the largest Russian naval deployment to the 
Mediterranean since the fall of the Soviet Union. Led by the aircraft carrier Admiral 
Kuznetsov, the 11 unit Russian battle group that achieved this feat returned to its home port 
on February 3, 2008, marking the end of the 71-day deployment.108 The deployment 
included the execution of over 400 aircraft sorties, numerous tactical exercises, and port 
calls to France, Italy, Portugal, and other countries.109 Mikhail Kashubsky underscored the 
significance of this deployment by highlighting the fact that there had been doubts as to 
whether the Kuznetsov could return to combat service. In Kashubsky’s words, “the return 
of the Kuznetsov to the Mediterranean, and such a significant display of Russian power 
projection and long-range offensive capabilities, were met with a degree of surprise in [the] 
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Western analytical and defense community.”110 Yet, the ship not only completed the 
deployment but also demonstrated on the world stage the revival of Russian power and 
Russia’s return to the Mediterranean as a strong state.  
Above all, the symbolic success of the 2008 deployment signaled a new phase in 
Russia’s post-Soviet Mediterranean naval activities. The Russian Navy began regular 
deployments to the Mediterranean, utilizing its facility at Tartus to maintain a presence 
in the region, and started to probe NATO naval responses.111 Moreover, when the 
U.S. government announced its intention to shift its national security policy focus to the 
Asia-Pacific theater in 2011, Russia capitalized on this opportunity to expand its 
Mediterranean operations. From 2011 on, the Kuznetsov carrier battle group 
made several deployments to the Mediterranean and conducted a wide range of 
air, air defense, and anti-submarine exercises.112  
With these developments since Putin’s declaration in 1999 that Russia would 
reestablish a permanent presence, it seemed likely that Russia would create a permanent 
naval task force in the eastern Mediterranean. This possibility materialized in 2013. In 
February of that year, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu stated that “it has been 
decided to set up a department of navy task force in the Mediterranean zone where naval 
forces will stay on a permanent basis.”113 By July 2013, Russia was conducting its largest 
naval maneuvers in the Mediterranean since the end of the Cold War. These were followed 
in December 2013 by another deployment of the Kuznetsov battle group to the region.114 
Russia could now be confident that it had established a permanent instrument to project 
power in the region. 
What further reinforced Russia’s confidence in this instrument was the fact that the 
fleet had substantially improved since beginning its Mediterranean activity. According to 
110 Kashubsky, “Russian Navy Reclaims its Blue-Water Force Status,” 33. 
111 Willett, “Back to Basics.” 
112 “Russian Aircraft Carrier, Warships Leave Syrian Waters,” BBC, January 10, 2012, https://search-
proquest-com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/docview/914947313. 
113 “Formation of Russian Navy Squadron for Operations in Mediterranean Begins.” 
114 Fedyszyn, “The Russian Navy ‘Rebalances’ to the Mediterranean.”  
33 
Dimitar Bechev, “since 2008, Russia has pursued the so-called State Armament Program 
(Gosudarstvennaia Programma Perevooruzheniia) whose goal is to modernize 
conventional forces.”115 Although Russia’s Mediterranean activity was once limited by its 
aging Soviet-era fleet, this modernization effort had a major impact on its Black Sea Fleet, 
as confirmed by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA): 
Beginning in 2014 after the occupation of Crimea, new units began to enter 
the order of battle including modern coastal missiles and naval infantry. 
Then in 2015, new submarines and surface combatants began to arrive to 
bolster the fleet. Now armed with the KALIBR missile system, the Black 
Sea Fleet is a significant force in the region and over the next few years 
could have as many as six new attack submarines and six new surface ships, 
which can not only exert control on the Black Sea, but can operate in the 
Mediterranean to counter NATO forces and support operations in Syria.116 
Additionally, Bechev points out that “the 2014 annexation of Crimea tipped the 
balance in the Black Sea in Russia’s favor. Moscow established full control over 
Sevastopol,” which provided “an enormous geographical advantage.”117 Consequently, the 
Black Sea Fleet and, by extension, the Mediterranean fleet had developed into a 
strengthened and credible maritime force that could easily be used to advance Moscow’s 
interests in the eastern Mediterranean. More importantly, the annexation of Crimea 
signaled a new phase for Russia’s aggressive geopolitical posturing.  
One of the more alarming developments for the EU was Russia’s deepening 
cooperation with Cyprus in 2015. Owing perhaps to the increasing instability in Syria, 
Bechev notes, “ahead of President Nikos Anastasiades’s visit to Moscow in late February 
2015, there was a frenzy of speculation that Cyprus was preparing to give Russia rights to 
bases at the port of Limassol as well as the Andreas Papandreou airbase.”118 However, 
Bechev adds the outcome of the meeting was instead a renewal of a 1996 defense 
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agreement and “another document allowing Russian warship access to Limassol (which 
they [the Russians] had enjoyed since 2013).”119 Although Putin emphasized that the port’s 
use was for counter-terrorism and counter-piracy efforts, the development was particularly 
worrisome for Great Britain as Cyprus hosts approximately 3,200 British troops.120 In 
short, the agreement not only reaffirmed Russia’s foothold in the eastern Mediterranean 
but also suggested that Moscow had new objectives in the region. 
When Russia updated its maritime doctrine in 2015, it provided a clear indication 
of these new objectives. The doctrine revealed that Russia aims to use its Mediterranean 
presence as an instrument to expand its influence and achieve foreign policy objectives, 
stating that “naval activities are among the highest state priorities,” and that “the navy is 
designed to ensure the defense of the national interests of the Russian Federation…by 
military means, to maintain military-political stability at the global and regional levels, and 
to repel aggression from sea and ocean directions.”121 Indeed, as British analyst Richard 
Connolly notes, the updated “doctrine signals the intentions of the Russian leadership to 
maintain a permanent naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean in support of wider 
Russian foreign and security objectives.”122 In fact, the doctrine explicitly states under its 
Mediterranean objectives an intention to ensure “a sufficient naval presence of the Russian 
Federation in the region on an ongoing basis.”123 The doctrine also declares Russia’s aims 
to develop the infrastructure of its ports from “Crimea and the Krasnodar Territory to the 
countries of the Mediterranean basin.”124 Connolly asserts that Russia’s updated doctrine 
“should be a source of concern for NATO given that the priority areas stated in the doctrine 
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all lie contiguous to member state borders.”125 Accordingly, it is important to analyze 
Russia’s actions following the release of this doctrine and to determine whether Russia has 
continued to pursue the ambitions outlined in the doctrine. 
Based on this updated maritime doctrine, and against the backdrop of Moscow’s 
increasingly aggressive military and geopolitical posturing, most analysts were unsurprised 
that Russia’s military intervention in the Syrian Civil War resulted in another deployment 
of the Admiral Kuznetsov battle group to the Mediterranean in 2016.126 However, this 
deployment stands out because it was an opportunity to conduct live combat operations. 
Upon its arrival in the eastern Mediterranean, the Kuznetsov’s “command center controlled 
not only its own air component, but also air-force Su-24 combat aircraft based at 
Khmeimim air base in Syria.”127 Owing to the loss of two combat aircraft during their 
recovery and the fact that just 30 of the 360 naval Su-33 combat sorties were made from 
the carrier, some analysts have assessed the ship’s air operations as unsuccessful.128 At the 
same time, the use of long-range cruise missiles launched by both Russian submarines and 
surface ships was generally considered effective and successful.129 While it may be true 
that the performance of the air component of the operations was suboptimal, the Kuznetsov 
and the rest of the battlegroup nonetheless demonstrated their ability to conduct operations 
in this environment. Furthermore, Russia gained a significant amount of live combat 
experience and lessons learned that will help the navy to improve its capabilities. Finally, 
it showed the world that Russia is willing to utilize its offensive naval capabilities in pursuit 
of its foreign policy objectives. 
Additional confirmation of Russia’s commitment to the objectives stated in its 
updated doctrine was apparent in January 2017 when Russia and Syria signed agreements 
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that gave Russia continued access to Syria’s Tartus port installation.130 Under the 49-year 
agreement, Russia is allowed to expand and modernize the Syrian facility to host 11 
warships, including nuclear-powered ships. This represents a considerable expansion from 
its current capacity of four vessels. On December 29, 2017, Putin signed the legislation 
ratifying the agreement and said that both Tartus and the Russian-controlled Hmeimim air 
base would continue operating “on a permanent basis” despite the declared partial 
withdrawal of Russian troops from Syria.131 This agreement indicates that Russia is 
actively seeking to develop its regional influence and that Moscow has long-term interests 
in the region, far beyond its current role in Syria and the eastern Mediterranean.  
C. CONCLUSION 
Since the Soviet era, the Mediterranean has been a key objective to facilitate 
Russian power projection. Establishing a capable and permanent Mediterranean force has 
been seen as key to supporting Russian security interests and as a step toward the 
achievement of Russia’s wider foreign policy objectives. Despite several obstacles along 
the path, Russia has remained committed to reestablishing a permanent Mediterranean 
naval presence and becoming a major player in the region in order to project power and 
rebuild its reputation as a strong state. While Yeltsin did little to advance toward this goal, 
Putin paved the way for Russia’s return to the region by rebuilding key relationships and 
developing a long-term policy for the Mediterranean.  
By developing this permanent Mediterranean naval force, Russia has created an 
instrument of hard power that is central to regional power projection, supporting and 
protecting its interests, and advancing Russia’s wider foreign policy objectives. Moreover, 
as the 2016 Kuznetsov task force deployment to the eastern Mediterranean has 
demonstrated, Russia is both able and willing to use its Mediterranean forces in combat 
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roles to support national objectives. Russia’s steps toward developing its Mediterranean 
force have often come at the expense of a weakening Western position. Accordingly, as 
Russia continues its aggressive military and geopolitical posturing, NATO must recognize 
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III. FRANCE, ITALY, SPAIN: PERCEPTIONS AND POLICIES 
At first glance, Russia’s increased Mediterranean naval activity and its aggressive 
geopolitical activity since 2008 appear significant enough to encourage France, Italy, and 
Spain to shift their perceptions and policies to view this presence as among the greatest 
threats to national security. However, as NATO southern flank border states, finding the 
balance between national security priorities has proven challenging, and the Russian threat 
must also be weighed in conjunction with threats emanating from instability in the Middle 
East and North Africa. This chapter analyzes the perceptions and policies of France, Italy, 
and Spain and how these perceptions and policies have changed in response to Russia’s 
Mediterranean activity and the complex mix of challenges in the evolving Mediterranean 
security environment. American scholar David Yost has said that, “continuing divergence 
among the strategic interests and priorities of an ever greater number of Allies could place 
into question NATO’s ability to pursue its missions effectively.”132 It is in this sense that 
it is important to determine whether Russia’s Mediterranean naval activity has led to a 
convergence among Southern and Eastern Allied security priorities, or whether France, 
Italy, and Spain hold that Russia remains a challenge limited to the Eastern flank. This 
chapter argues that, although the perceptions and policies of these allies have gradually 
shifted to perceive Russia and its increased Mediterranean naval presence as a potential 
threat, immediate nontraditional security issues remain a higher priority, a circumstance 
that limits the extent to which these Allies are willing to regard Russia’s naval presence as 
a threat. 
A. FRANCE 
As the distinction between Mediterranean security and North African stability has 
been increasingly blurred, France’s Mediterranean policy has generally been shaped by 
regional dynamics that are recognized as linked to French national security. In 2013, France 
released its White Paper on defense and national security. Replacing the 2008 French 
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White Paper on Defense and National Security, the 2013 White Paper was developed in 
response to the rapidly changing global security environment that “called for new strategic 
guidelines.”133 Above all, the paper outlined three priorities for the French “defense 
strategy: protection, deterrence and intervention.”134 Building upon these priorities, the 
paper identified factors that are the most consequential to French national security 
including military and diplomatic objectives, alliance frameworks, risks, and threats.  
Even though the 2013 White Paper made no direct reference to Russia’s 
Mediterranean naval activity, it did reveal some French perceptions regarding Russian 
geopolitical ambitions. The paper acknowledged Russia’s military growth while also 
underscoring the fact that Russia has demonstrated “increasing displays of strength” such 
as “political exploitation of its energy resources” and the 2008 aggression in Georgia.135 
At the same time, the paper assessed that “Russia is equipping itself with the economic and 
military clout that will enable it to engage in power politics.”136 Beyond these 
acknowledgements of aggressive behavior, however, the White Paper suggested that 
France did not consider Russia a threat to national security at this point in time. The paper 
observed that “France has made close cooperation with Moscow one of its political 
objectives for the NATO Summit Declaration in Chicago.”137 
In fact, the 2013 White Paper stated that “France no longer faces any direct, explicit 
conventional military threat against its territory.”138 However, it is important to note French 
concerns regarding the Mediterranean. The Middle East, the Mediterranean, and North 
Africa are emphasized as priority areas of interest for French and European security. 
Specifically, in the 2013 White Paper France recognized North Africa as an area of high 
risk because of the “unstable conditions following the Arab revolutions” and concerns 
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about terrorism and the trafficking of drugs, humans, and weapons.139 While these issues 
stem from North Africa, they are perceived to extend themselves as a “potential challenge 
for the whole of the Mediterranean and Southern Europe.”140 
Although the 2015 French National Strategy for the Security of Maritime Areas 
presented perceptions of the nontraditional security challenges similar to those that were 
presented in the 2013 White Paper, the 2015 National Strategy stressed the worsening 
geopolitical and security conditions in the Mediterranean. Accordingly, the strategy 
attributed “a massive increase in refugee flows or economic migrants, the development of 
illegal trafficking (drugs, arms, humans…) and a worsening of the terrorist threat” to the 
increased destabilization of North African countries.141 Furthermore, the strategy stated 
that this destabilization contributes to the increased “threat against our interests and brings 
it nearer to Europe and France.”142 Owing perhaps to this deteriorating security 
environment in North Africa and the Mediterranean, the strategy showed little concern for 
Russia’s increased Mediterranean naval activity. The strategy did not explicitly mention 
Russian naval activity, but it did point out that “we are seeing the emergence, or the return, 
of great maritime powers which contribute to establishing new regional balances, which 
are potentially more unstable.”143 This statement demonstrated that despite the Russian 
aggression displayed during the Crimean Crisis of 2014, France had yet to fully 
acknowledge the increased Russian activity in the Mediterranean, at least in its 2013 and 
2015 published defense strategies. 
Despite multiple points of convergent interests, French-Russian relations have 
progressively cooled as a direct result of Russian aggression. In 2010, France agreed to 
build and sell two Mistral helicopter carrier vessels to Russia.144 Although the delivery of 
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the first ship was expected in the fall of 2014, France abandoned the agreement following 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the ensuing pressure from other Allies to cancel the 
deal.145 Moreover, in response to the annexation, France joined several Allies (including 
Britain, Germany, and the United States) in imposing sanctions on Russia for its 
intervention in Ukraine.146 Despite these sanctions, however, France and Russia continued 
their dialogue, and in November 2015 they found common interests in fighting ISIS in 
Syria. Indeed, following a series of terror attacks in Paris, France accelerated the 
deployment of the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle to the eastern Mediterranean to launch 
airstrikes against ISIS. Subsequently, there were signs of rapprochement as the French 
aircraft carrier coordinated operations with the Russian naval flotilla in the area.147 
However, this apparent reconciliation was short-lived due to disagreements over Russian 
actions in Syria.  
Russia’s indiscriminate bombing of the Syrian city of Aleppo marked a notable 
turning point in France’s perception of the Russian maritime threat. In October 2016, 
François Hollande, then the French President, called for war crime charges against Russia 
and accused Russia of attacking civilians during its bombing campaign.148 In September 
2017, French Defense Minister Florence Parly condemned the Zapad military exercise, 
conducted by Russia and Belarus, calling the demonstration a part of Russia’s strategy of 
intimidation.149 In short, Russia’s provocative military activities have pushed France to 
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address Russia’s military assertiveness and to acknowledge the genuineness of the Russian 
threat. 
Russia’s increased aggression evoked an evident shift in France’s perception of 
Russian maritime activities. At the NATO Warsaw Summit in July 2016, François 
Hollande, then the French President, offered sharp criticisms of Russia’s destabilizing 
actions and policies that have, he observed, “posed further risks and challenges for the 
security of the Allies,” such as the “provocative military activities near NATO borders, 
including in the Baltic and Black Sea regions and the Eastern Mediterranean.”150 Although 
he expressed an intention to maintain communications with Russia and reaffirmed that 
NATO has no aggressive intent, his remarks indicated that France recognizes Russia’s 
increased naval activity in the Mediterranean and, more important, the resurgent threat 
Russia represents for the Alliance. Additionally, in November 2016, Jean-Yves Le Drian, 
then the French Defense Minister, denounced Russian submarine activity in the Bay of 
Biscay.151 In short, France’s denunciations of certain Russian maritime activities 
demonstrate that, despite its support for dialogue with Russia, France is openly willing to 
characterize Russia’s naval presence as a threat.  
Despite previous decisions to exclude Russia from France’s published defense 
strategy, French policymakers have revisited Russia’s posture in the Mediterranean and its 
implications for French security. According to an unnamed French think tank analyst, 
Russia understands France’s “strategic saturation” and its struggle to establish priorities.152 
Additionally, analysts Stephanie Pezard, Andrew Radin, and others have explained that 
“France has also consistently advocated a diplomatic rather than military response” to the 
Ukraine crisis.153 This suggestion supports the conjecture that while France may have 
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prioritized threats resulting from North African instability, Russia’s aggressive actions 
have compelled French policymakers to reassess the significance of Russia’s behavior in 
the Mediterranean and its level of priority within French defense policy.  
In February 2017, the French National Assembly’s Committee on National Defense 
and the Armed Forces presented a report to the French National Assembly that explored 
challenges to French security and the role of the French Navy in the Mediterranean. While 
the report repeated many of the North African concerns described in the 2013 and 2015 
strategies, the 2017 report formally recognized the return of Russian power in the 
Mediterranean. Specifically, the report noted the permanent presence of the Russian Navy, 
including the presence of Russian submarines and the deployments of the Admiral 
Kuznetsov carrier battle group, and linked the Tartus and Latakia naval bases to Russia’s 
will to preserve its strategic capabilities in the region.154 While the comments within the 
report regarding Russia’s naval activity were limited, especially when compared to the 
extensive focus on the migrant crisis and instability in North Africa, the report 
demonstrated that the French government has identified worrying patterns in Russia’s 
Mediterranean activities that require more attention. 
In the last quarter of 2017, France published its 2017 Defense and National Security 
Strategic Review. It offered a striking contrast from previous policy documents on national 
security priorities. The review was developed in response to “upheavals observed since 
2013, in particular the jihadist terrorist attacks on French soil, as well as the deteriorating 
security situation at Europe’s borders and the need to prepare a new Military Planning Act 
consistent with the engagements” of the French military forces.155 While it remains a policy 
document that shapes French security programs, the review also explains that what largely 
separates it from the previous white papers is that the central issue is less “the identification 
and anticipation of trends” and more “the increased pace and intensity of changes.”156 In 
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other words, while previous documents generally aimed at recognizing emerging risks and 
concerns, the 2017 review explicitly specified pressing threats to French national security. 
Moreover, although the review frequently reaffirmed the importance of partners, allies, and 
multilateralism for achieving national security objectives, the French Defense Minister 
stated in the review’s foreword that France “can no longer rely everywhere and forever 
with absolute certainty on our traditional partners.”157 Accordingly, this statement suggests 
that the threats outlined within the review were considered in an impartial manner and 
independently of alliance circumstances.  
It is important to note that the North African region remains a high priority for 
French national security. The 2017 review recalled the 2015 terrorist attacks on French soil 
and emphasized that the Sahel-Sahara region continues to be “a high priority in France’s 
fight against terrorism and trafficking as well as in the protection of French expatriates.”158 
In fact, according to the review, “Jihadist terrorism is the most immediate and significant 
threat we face, as it is directed against our homeland and population.”159 Accordingly, the 
2017 review explained that on one hand, “geography will remain an important driver” for 
determining security protection priorities and that “physical flows (such as trafficking and 
illegal migration) that affect our security also depend on geography.”160 On the other hand, 
however, it noted that “geographical proximity cannot be the sole criterion” and that 
“France intends to fulfill its responsibilities globally, not limiting them to its own 
neighborhood.”161 The document therefore emphasized that “a collective awareness of 
shared security issues is emerging, particularly now that Europeans are finding themselves 
slightly more alone than in the past.”162 In short, although geography remains an important 
consideration to French security, collective threat assessments are gradually developing as 
an influential factor. 
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While previous strategies lacked definitive assessments of the Russian threat, the 
2017 review was unambiguous regarding the French perception of Russia. The review 
reinforced a collective threat assessment perception by noting that “Europe’s eastern and 
northern flanks have experienced the reassertion of Russian power and the resurgence of 
war. They are also affected by Moscow’s intent to rebuild a sphere of influence.”163 With 
reference to the Baltics the review noted that “Moscow’s aggressive posture manifests 
itself through recurrent military demonstration”164 and highlighted NATO’s response and 
French contributions to forward deployed forces. Finally, while discussing the North 
Atlantic region, the review pointed out the “increase in Russian activities,” including 
“flights of strategic bombers and deployments of submarines” and recognized that with 
“Russian activity there is a major concern, which France shares with its main allies.”165 
The shift in the French perception of the Russian threat is clear. Where the 2013 White 
Paper generally described Russia’s military activities in broad terms, the 2017 review 
directly detailed Russian transgressions. The former called for closer cooperation, while 
the latter emphasized that Russian power “must be met with a firm response combined with 
dialogue.”166  
Above all, the 2017 review revealed the French policy shift regarding Russia’s 
Mediterranean naval activity. Specifically, the review recognized that the Mediterranean is 
“experiencing a return of power politics, with the permanent presence of Russian air and 
naval forces.”167 The review also highlighted Russia’s “policy of all-out assertion” within 
the Mediterranean Sea and confirmed that France considers this Russian approach as going 
“hand in hand with various forms of strategic intimidation.”168 Finally, the review showed 
the French concern for the “increased militarization” of the Mediterranean and underscored 
the fact that “Russia has recovered its status as a Mediterranean power, evidenced by air 
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and sea power demonstrations and by its long-term presence in the eastern Mediterranean, 
supported by a strengthened network of overseas bases between Crimea and Syria.”169 The 
new emphasis placed on Russia’s Mediterranean activity departed considerably from 
previous strategic policy documents that scarcely showed concern for Russia’s 
Mediterranean naval activities. 
Although France has traditionally viewed Russia as the primary threat on NATO’s 
eastern flank, there has been a clear shift in the French perspective. The Russian aggression 
is no longer viewed as only an eastward-oriented problem. France now perceives Russia as 
a rising challenge on the Alliance’s northern, southern, and eastern flanks. While many of 
France’s familiar security priorities (including terrorism and destabilization in North 
Africa) remain, French perceptions and policies share Alliance concerns about Russia’s 
aggressive behavior across all domains.  
B. ITALY 
Italy perceives security and stability in the Mediterranean region as fundamental to 
national security. In 2015, the Italian government published a White Paper for International 
Security and Defense. Comments regarding Russia are entirely absent from the document. 
Instead, the paper recognized that security in the Mediterranean is “influenced by dynamics 
occurring in adjacent areas.”170 Accordingly, the paper identified stability in the Mashreq, 
the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, and the Persian Gulf as linked to challenges such as mass 
migration, illegal trafficking, and international terrorism. The paper emphasized that the 
“achievement of a high degree of stability and democratic development in the countries 
that affect the Mediterranean is therefore a priority for our country.”171 The paper also 
placed Euro-Mediterranean security on the same level as Euro-Atlantic security by 
stressing that “in the Euro-Atlantic context the participation in established mechanisms of 
prevention, deterrence, and collective defence…ensures that the nation’s security 
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conditions are adequate, [and that] it is only possible to create similar conditions in the 
Euro-Mediterranean region if an intervention in this area is given national priority.”172 In 
other words, Italy regards engagement in the region by multilateral frameworks as 
paramount to creating a secure and stable Mediterranean. Because Russian naval activity 
is absent from the paper, this statement underscores the perceived importance of stability 
in North Africa and its impact on Italian security.  
In order to fully understand the consequences of instability in North Africa for 
Italian security, the country’s migrant crisis must be analyzed. The rise of terrorism in 
North Africa and the instability in Libya have resulted in an unprecedented flow of 
migrants onto Italian shores, far exceeding arrivals in France or Spain.173 According to 
Frontex data, the first mass wave of immigration to Italy occurred in 2011, with 
64,300 migrants arriving. Although there was a decrease to 15,900 in 2012 and 40,000 in 
2013, another large wave occurred in 2014 with 170,760 arriving. In 2015, there was a 
slight decrease to 153,946 migrants, but by 2016 the number arriving in Italy reached 
181,126.174 In contrast, the Western Mediterranean route to Spain was limited to 
9,990 arrivals in 2016.  
As a result, Italy has been preoccupied with the migration crisis and the resultant 
risks of criminal organizations and terrorism. The European Union Agency for Law 
Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) has assessed that “more than 90 percent of the 
migrants coming to the EU are facilitated, mostly by members of a criminal network,” and 
that “there is an increased risk that foreign terrorist fighters may use the migratory flows 
to enter the EU.”175 Indeed, according to the Italian Ministry of Interior, between March 
2016 and March 2017, authorities questioned 160,593 people, arrested about 550 suspected 
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terrorists, and sentenced 38 people on terrorism charges.176 Consequently, the impact of 
the migrant crisis and the ever-increasing terror threat represent major security concerns 
for Italy, which may explain Italian desires to prioritize Euro-Mediterranean stability rather 
than Russia’s Mediterranean naval activity.  
Italy has taken several steps to manage the migration crisis and improve 
Mediterranean security. In October 2013, the Italian government commenced Operation 
Mare Nostrum, a year-long naval and air operation dedicated to managing the migration 
crisis, countering smuggling, and conducting maritime security operations.177 
Additionally, following a worsening of Libyan stability, in March 2015 Italy launched 
Operation Mare Sicuro, which conducts information collecting, search and rescue 
operations, and counter-smuggling operations. Although multilateral initiatives are 
discussed in Chapter IV of this thesis, it is important to note that Italy also plays a leading 
role in the Frontex-initiated multilateral Operation Themis and contributes to EU and 
NATO operations in the Mediterranean. Italian analyst Alessandra Vernile noted that “the 
Italian government is managing the migrant crisis principally as an internal problem related 
exclusively to Italy” and that with this approach it “has been easier to set up dual missions, 
aiming to protect national borders and the Italian national interests.”178 In other words, Italy 
conducts unilateral and multilateral operations to enhance its border security and to address 
national security concerns. Despite Italy’s various approaches, there is still no end in sight 
to the crisis, and it remains a significant consideration when weighed against other threats. 
Although the Italian Navy is profoundly committed to migrant crisis operations, its 
activities are not limited to this immediate security challenge; as a result, the navy is 
modernizing to meet all of Italy’s strategic needs. In 2016, Admiral Giuseppe De Giorgi, 
then the Chief of Staff of the Italian Navy, noted that in the previous ten years the Italian 
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Navy had engaged in a wide-range of operations, “some conventional, as in the case of the 
Libyan crisis in 2011; and some related to maritime security, such as the counter-piracy 
operations in the Horn of Africa, interweaved with humanitarian operations.”179  
However, the Italian fleet is aging. While there are approximately 60 ships in the 
Italian Navy, on average only 20 are available at any given time.180 Consequently, in 2015, 
the Italian Parliament approved the Legge Navale plan, which appropriated the equivalent 
of $5.7 billion of funding to acquire several new offshore patrol vessels, one logistics 
support ship (LSS), and one landing helicopter dock (LHD) vessel.181 According to the 
plan, the multipurpose characteristics of these ships will provide Italy with useful tools in 
all maritime safety activities such as search and rescue and disaster relief.182 Although the 
plan emphasizes humanitarian aid support and safety roles for these vessels, given Italy’s 
active involvement in NATO maritime activities, Italy’s naval modernization may also 
serve as a means to counter conventional state actor threats, including Russia.  
There have been some indications that Italy’s perception of Russia’s naval presence 
in the Mediterranean has marginally shifted in recent years. To illustrate, in 2004–2014 
Italy and Russia annually conducted the IONIEX (Ionian Sea Exercise) drills, to promote 
cooperation between the navies, but the exercise ceased in 2014.183 The termination 
correlated with Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine (and Moscow’s annexation of 
Crimea) and signaled both an apparent departure from positive Italian-Russian naval 
relations and a subtle shift in the Italian perspective on Russia’s naval presence in the 
Mediterranean.  
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A comparison of comments by Italian government officials with statements by 
leaders in the Italian Navy raises the possibility that Italy remains sensitive to Russian 
perceptions of Italian policy. In 2015, Admiral Giuseppe de Giorgi addressed the return of 
Russian submarines in the Mediterranean and underscored the need for preparedness for 
conventional forms of maritime warfare.184 In contrast, in 2016 the Italian Minister of 
Defense, Roberta Pinotti, suggested that the Russians could be a key actor in stabilizing 
the Mediterranean, going so far as to state that rather than “a potential adversary, I wish 
them as a potential ally.”185 However, in September 2017, the Italian Chief of Staff, Vice 
Admiral Valter Girardelli, noted Russia’s naval presence in the Mediterranean and stressed 
the necessity for the Italian Navy to continue its defense activities.186 These comments 
suggest that Italian military leaders recognize the Russian naval presence as a potential 
threat, but due to the government’s desire for regional stability, they may be reluctant to 
label Russia’s presence as a threat in any written policy.  
In 2017, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a document titled Italian 
Strategy in the Mediterranean that, in contrast to the 2015 White Paper, discussed Russia 
in the Mediterranean. In short, the strategy refrained from labeling Russia’s naval presence 
as a threat or a concern. To a great extent, the strategy reemphasized Italy’s perceptions 
shared in the 2015 White Paper, notably North African instability, terrorism, and the 
migration crisis. However, the strategy also noted that “amidst the resulting regional chaos, 
international protagonists like Russia have come back to the fore…The Mediterranean has 
thus become a multipolar region, where the centers of power have multiplied and political 
agendas…are increasingly in competition.”187 The strategy frequently called for 
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cooperation and multilateralism in the Mediterranean or, more specifically, “a 
multilateralism that embraces a ‘win-win’ approach and is not the victim of a ‘zero-sum 
game.’”188 Additionally, in discussing the Italian perspective on the Syrian crisis, the 
strategy stated that “a dialogue with Russia is essential, as a lasting political solution to the 
Syrian conflict necessarily involves also Moscow.”189 Ultimately, these statements 
reinforce the idea that Italy recognizes Russia’s increased Mediterranean naval activity, but 
any inclination to label this presence a threat in written policy is eclipsed by stronger 
desires to maintain a positive dialogue with Russia while aiming for cooperation in 
managing regional instability. 
There are, however, additional reasons apart from these strategic concerns as to 
why Italy is disinclined to perceive Russia’s Mediterranean presence as a threat. One 
possible factor is that Italy seeks to maintain positive relations with Russia, both politically 
and economically. Italy has been among the most vocal members of the European Union 
in calling for the easing of sanctions imposed on Russia after the Crimea crisis.190 Indeed, 
Italy is particularly sensitive to the sanctions due to close Italian-Russian market ties. 
Russia is the main supplier of Italian energy resources, making up to 20 percent of Italian 
oil imports and 47 percent of Italian natural gas imports.191 At the same time, political 
leaders have called for greater cooperation with Moscow to resolve global issues.192 
Despite these factors, however, Russian analyst Alexander Dunaev argues that “Italy 
supports Russia, but more in words than in actions,” pointing out that “the most Rome has 
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done is oppose the automatic extension of sanctions and impede efforts to ratchet up 
pressure on Russia.” Moreover, he concludes that “Italy values its ties with Russia, but it 
values mutual understanding with key EU nations and the United States more. Italy won’t 
sacrifice that for the Kremlin.”193 Accordingly, it is necessary to analyze Italy’s actions on 
NATO’s eastern flank to understand the Italian approach and its perceptions.  
Italian actions on the eastern flank have shown that the Italian approach to Russia 
has been firm, yet sensitive to Russian perceptions. To illustrate, Italy has demonstrated its 
commitment to the 2014 Wales Summit reassurance measures, contributing to the Baltic 
air policing missions in 2015; and in January 2018 Italy took over as the lead nation for the 
Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF).194 However, Italy took steps to limit the 
size of the Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) units, reflecting the “Italian position” that 
Francesca Bitondo, Alessandro Marrone, and Paola Sartori have explained as follows: Italy 
“stands firm to the necessity to avoid exacerbations of confrontational tones with 
Moscow.” Additionally, these three scholars have suggested that “Russia’s increasing 
political and military activism in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East ended up with 
connecting the dynamics of the Eastern flank with those of the Southern one.”195 As a 
result, Italy considers it “even more crucial to set a dialogue with Moscow not only on the 
Ukraine scenario but also on other crises involving Russia.”196 In this context, Italy may 
view Russia’s Mediterranean activity as only a part of the sum of Russia’s overall behavior. 
This perception would suggest that Italy recognizes Russia’s Mediterranean activity but 
finds it more important to “stand firm” on the Eastern flank, rather than on both flanks in 
order to avoid aggravating tensions with Moscow. In short, the degree of Italy’s firmness 
may represent a balance between where the Italians consider it necessary to reinforce their 
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collective defense credibility and, on the other hand, where dialogue and cooperation are 
needed to resolve national security concerns.  
C. SPAIN 
Spain’s perceptions and policies regarding Russia’s Mediterranean activity have 
shifted gradually over the years since the publication of the 2013 National Security 
Strategy. Similar to the strategy statements of France and Italy, the 2013 National Strategy 
identified the Mediterranean as a major strategic priority, aiming for “peace, stability, and 
prosperity on the southern shore of the Mediterranean,” a priority tied to the future of 
Spain’s security.197 Accordingly, the strategy considered North Africa linked to security 
concerns such as migratory flows, terrorism, and various types of illegal trafficking. As a 
result of these concerns, the Spanish strategy stated that priority must be given to stability 
and development in the North African region, observing that “Africa poses significant 
security challenges and must continue to be given preferential attention.”198 Additionally, 
the strategy frequently emphasized collaboration, cooperation, and multilateralism with 
partners and allies to manage global security challenges.199  
While Russia was discussed in the 2013 National Strategy, there was nothing to 
suggest that Spain perceived Russia as a threat or a concern. Rather, Russia was referred 
to as “a key strategic actor of great importance to the European energy market.” The 
strategy also stated that “cooperating with Moscow is essential to Europe’s security and 
stability” and therefore called on Russia to “contribute to settling longstanding conflicts in 
the strategic environment it shares with the [European] Union, as this will enhance the 
democratic stability of the countries involved and the security of everyone.”200 Beyond 
these statements, however, the strategy did not address Russia’s Mediterranean activity or 
its international behavior.  
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When discussing Spanish national security concerns, it is important to note that 
Madrid’s desire for stability in North Africa is also motivated by security concerns for the 
two Spanish enclaves on the northern shores of the Moroccan coast, Ceuta and Melilla. To 
illustrate, in February 2017, Spain grew particularly concerned after nearly 500 migrants 
and refugees broke through a fence surrounding Ceuta in an attempt to reach Europe.201 
Although Spain’s number of migrant arrivals from Africa has been lower than Italy’s in 
recent years, the migrant crisis remains a major security concern. Additionally, Spain was 
expected to see a rise in migration after an Italian crackdown in 2017 on NGOs operating 
rescue missions in the central Mediterranean, with migrants and various organizations 
(both legal and criminal) turning to the Western Mediterranean Route from Morocco to 
Spain.202 Indeed, this crackdown may have been a major contributing factor as to why 
migrant arrivals in Spain jumped from 9,990 in 2016 to nearly 23,143 by the end of 2017.203 
Although this number is much lower than Italy’s 118,962 arrivals in 2017, it nonetheless 
demonstrates that the migration crisis weighs heavily in Spain’s national security concerns. 
Despite Spain’s primary focus on threats emanating from North Africa, the Spanish 
Navy engages in a wide range of operations, but none of these indicates shifts in the 
Spanish perspective on Russia’s Mediterranean naval activity. Spanish defense analyst 
Manuel J. Ruiz Isac noted that the two main priorities of Spain’s fleet are (a) contributing 
to NATO maritime activities in the face of the “Russian challenge in the Baltic, North, and 
Eastern Mediterranean Seas” and (b) participating in EU missions against human 
trafficking in the central Mediterranean.204 However, the General Lines of the Navy 2017, 
a document that outlined the objectives of the Chief of Staff of the Spanish Navy, did not 
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directly identify Russia as a threat.205 While the document did stress multilateralism and 
“the emergence of new” state and non-state actors, the specifics regarding these challenges 
were unclear.206 Additionally, although the Spanish Navy has played an active role in 
several multilateral missions such as NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian and Standing 
NATO Maritime Group 2, NATO’s maritime components conduct a broad range of 
security tasks that are not all strictly related to Russian naval activities. Therefore, Spain’s 
participation does not fully reveal the extent of Spain’s shift in perception of Russia’s 
increased Mediterranean naval presence.  
Spain has attempted to maintain a position between Russia and the Alliance that is 
proving to be untenable. Francisco de Borja Lasheras, a Spanish policy analyst, has pointed 
out that Spain’s policy toward “Russia necessitates that it performs a balancing act between 
de-escalation and détente with Moscow, on the one hand…and Allied assurance in NATO 
on the other.”207 While it has proven difficult for Spain to manage this balancing act, Spain 
tends to hold collective defense obligations higher than how Russia perceives its actions. 
To illustrate, in October 2016, despite objections from several NATO allies, Spain 
approved a Russian request for a naval flotilla to refuel at the Ceuta port. Russia later 
withdrew the refueling request.208 However, that same month Pedro Morenés, then the 
Spanish Minister of Defense, announced Madrid’s intention to deploy Spanish soldiers to 
Latvia, as part of the series of NATO missions in the Baltic region.209 
Although Russia itself withdrew the refueling request, Moscow appeared 
displeased with the end result. In response to the Spanish decision to deploy soldiers to 
Latvia, the Russian Defense Minister, Sergey Shoygu, declared, “we were surprised by the 
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position of individual countries which, under the pressure of the United States and NATO, 
publicly refused to allow our ships to enter their ports. It’s time for western partners to 
decide whom they are really fighting with: terrorists or Russia.”210 Despite these remarks, 
Spain moved forward with the decision to deploy troops in Latvia. This deployment is 
noteworthy because it not only demonstrates Spain’s commitment to collective defense, 
but also suggests that Spain recognizes that the conventional military threat posed by 
Russia should not be completely ignored.  
Spain’s shift in perception of Russia’s naval activity in the Mediterranean became 
evident through the Spanish Annual National Security Report. This annually published 
report presents a comprehensive analysis of Spain’s current national security challenges, 
which are assessed against the background of the 2013 National Security Strategy. As 
previously noted, the 2013 National Strategy emphasized that cooperation with Russia is 
“essential to Europe’s security and stability.”211 In contrast, the 2014 security report 
recognized Russia’s aggressive actions in Ukraine that signified a “change in the European 
security landscape” and presented “a new challenge for national defense within the 
framework of Spain’s commitment to international safety, both within the European Union 
and NATO.”212 Additionally, the report noted that Russian’s actions in Ukraine and the 
annexation of Crimea posed “a threat to the stability and security of the entire Euro-Atlantic 
space, with possible long-term effects in the Black Sea area.”213 Assessing Russia’s 
behavior as a threat to European security represented a substantial shift from Spain’s 
perception the previous year.  
The 2014 security report also demonstrated Spain’s perception of the Russian threat 
on NATO’s eastern flank. Indeed, the report discussed the Wales summit and explained 
that this “summit focused mainly on the greatest threats to Euro-Atlantic security: those 
from the Eastern Flank (Russia/Ukraine) and the Southern Flank (constituting regions of 
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the Middle East, and the North of Africa, and the Sahel.)”214 Furthermore, the report points 
out that “decisions were adopted to face them jointly.”215 This statement, and the inclusion 
of Russia as an eastern threat, represented more than just a nod to the eastern Allies. It also 
signified that Spain recognized the eastern flank threat and that a unity of effort was 
required to reinforce collective defense credibility. Although there were no statements 
regarding Russia’s Mediterranean naval activity, the report nonetheless showed a deviation 
from Spain’s previously established perception.  
Although the 2015 Spanish security report did not suggest a further shift in 
perspective, it did show some concerns. Overall, the 2015 report made few remarks 
regarding Russia. The most prominent was a section discussing Russia’s modified military 
doctrine in December 2014. Specifically, the report highlighted “the modernization and 
development of nuclear forces” and the fact that “Russia added forty new intercontinental 
ballistic missiles to its nuclear arsenal.”216 While this showed that Spain remained 
concerned about Russian behavior, it did not necessarily demonstrate a further shift in 
Spanish perceptions. 
Above all, the 2016 report revealed a further shift in Spain’s perceptions of Russian 
behavior, particularly Russia’s Mediterranean naval activity. This report again highlighted 
Russia’s “modernization of nuclear and ballistic weapons” as a “factor that generates a 
certain degree of added stress to the existing.”217 Moreover, the 2016 report noted the 
“expansion of Russia’s posture at the Tartus naval base” in Syria and Russia’s deployment 
of a “naval combat group to the Eastern Mediterranean.”218 The report declared that in 
response to this activity NATO has strengthened its presence “through regular naval 
deployments, exercises, and permanent maritime groups in the region.”219 The inclusion in 
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the 2016 report of Russia’s Mediterranean naval activity represented the first 
acknowledgement in any public strategic national security documents of Russia’s behavior 
in the Mediterranean, demonstrating another subtle shift in Spanish perceptions. 
Furthermore, because the Spanish Navy commanded NATO’s Mediterranean force, 
Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2), throughout 2016, the language of the 2016 
report indicated that Spain viewed Russia’s maritime presence as a concern for both Spain 
and the Allies which required a multilateral response.  
In December 2017, Spain published its updated National Security Strategy, noting 
that the security “environment has changed significantly since the approval of the 2013 
Strategy.”220 In the foreword, the Spanish prime minister stated that “the strategy defines 
a common position for all bodies with responsibilities in the area of security, in addition to 
enhancing synergies and aligning the State’s resources.”221 Accordingly, the strategy 
offered the most up to date picture of Spain’s perceptions of threats to its national security.  
While the 2017 National Strategy shared many of the same perceptions of strategic 
issues shown in the 2013 Strategy, there were some differences regarding Russia. Recalling 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the strategy stated that “its actions in eastern Ukraine have 
caused a deterioration in Europe’s security situation.”222 In reference to the dynamics 
transforming the global security environment, the strategy noted that “powers like China 
and Russia have taken a more active role on the international scene, projecting their power 
beyond their regions. Both of these countries have stepped up their defense spending and 
modernized their military capabilities.”223 Echoing previous security reports, this statement 
demonstrated that Spain recognizes that Russia’s ambitions are not restricted to the Russian 
periphery.  
According to the strategy, “the Mediterranean is an area where different States and 
international actors are seeking to project their power…Examples of this are Russia’s 
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strategic rapprochement to the western coast as a way to support its fleet in the 
Mediterranean.”224 This statement does not necessarily imply that Spain perceives the 
Russian fleet as a threat; to a greater extent it suggests that the Spanish government 
understands the ambitions behind Russia’s diplomatic maneuvers. Perhaps as a subtle 
response to this observation, the strategy states in the same paragraph that “the EU and 
NATO sea operations…address security challenges such as combating human trafficking 
networks; as well as the permanent deployment of U.S. warships with ballistic missile 
defense capabilities.”225 Seeking to maintain its balancing act, however, the strategy adds 
that “Spain is committed to [a] common strategic position within the framework of the EU 
and NATO, and to a critical but constructive dialogue with Russia.”226 Thus, while the 
strategy in many ways demonstrates Spanish shifts in perception with regard to Russia’s 
behavior, it also shows that sensitivities to Russia remain. Above all, when compared to 
the 2013 Strategy, the 2017 Strategy shows that there has been a clear shift in the Spanish 
perception of Russia’s Mediterranean activity. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The French, Italian, and Spanish perspectives on Russian naval activity in the 
Mediterranean have shifted as Russia has increased its naval presence in the Mediterranean 
since 2008. Despite previous decisions to avoid explicitly labeling Russia’s naval presence 
a threat, these Allies are increasingly considering this presence an emerging security 
challenge. However, the shift in perception does not fully correlate with Russia’s expanded 
Mediterranean naval activity, but instead, greater attention to this challenge has been 
consistent with the rising visibility of Russian military aggression. As Russia has become 
more aggressive, these Allies have reaffirmed collective defense commitments and they 
have shared Alliance concerns about Russia’s conventional military threat.  
Despite this shift in perspective, these Allies are southern flank border states that 
are directly subjected to the instability and nontraditional threats emanating from the 
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Middle East and North Africa. The extent that these Mediterranean Allies are willing to 
label Russia’s naval presence a threat is therefore an issue of strategic priorities rather than 
complete disagreement with other Allies about the fact that Russia represents a real threat 
for the Alliance. To illustrate, the impact of the migrant crisis has been significantly higher 
in Italy than in France and Spain, and this may help to explain why Italian policymakers 
have been less inclined to address Russia’s naval presence in any written policy. These 
policymakers have instead pursued an approach that addresses the most pressing areas of 
potential Russian aggression on the Eastern flank, while preparing for “conventional forms 
of maritime warfare” in the South and retaining hope that Russia will cooperate in 
addressing nontraditional threats in the Mediterranean. Conversely, policymakers in 
France and Spain have addressed Russia’s naval presence in the Mediterranean in their 
written policies and have been more sensitive to Russia’s increased aggression. Above all, 
it is not that these allies do not understand the challenge facing the Eastern Allies, but that 
the consequences of immediate security concerns remain a higher priority. 
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IV. FRENCH, ITALIAN, AND SPANISH MULTILATERAL 
SECURITY COOPERATION INITIATIVES 
As previously noted in Chapter III, French, Italian, and Spanish policy emphasizes 
the importance of partners, allies, and cooperation for achieving national security 
objectives. As these Allies face emerging security challenges, the responses of France, 
Italy, and Spain have consisted not only of national policy shifts but also increased 
engagement in multilateral Mediterranean security cooperation initiatives. This chapter 
concentrates on EU and NATO Mediterranean security cooperation initiatives to which 
France, Italy, and Spain contribute. This thesis offers two conclusions about their national 
perceptions and the impacts of these initiatives. First, although these Allies have generally 
supported EU cooperation initiatives, they generally regard the EU frameworks as unable 
to comprehensively address their security concerns. Second, while France, Italy, and Spain 
perceive NATO’s increased attention to the south as advantageous for their security 
objectives, they maintain that the Alliance should continue expanding its role in the region. 
A. EUROPEAN UNION INITIATIVES 
In 2014, the EU launched Operation Triton as a border control and surveillance 
operation led by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). In February 
2018, Operation Triton was renamed Operation Themis. Although the mission’s primary 
focus is border control, search and rescue operations have also played a prominent role, 
and it has recently broadened its tasks to include countering drug-smuggling, illegal 
fishing, and maritime pollution.227 According to the European Commission, Operation 
Themis aims to support “Italy with border control, surveillance, and search and rescue in 
the Central Mediterranean” and defines its operational area as “the territorial waters of 
Italy” with search and rescue zones up to 138 nautical miles south of Sicily.228  
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Although the French government appears cautious about relying on Frontex, it 
regards the initiative as a positive development for Euro-Med security. The 2015 French 
National Strategy for the Security of Maritime Areas explains that “France actively 
participates in maritime operations coordinated by the Frontex agency, and promotes its 
expertise to the Agency through the participation of its activities concerning the maritime 
domain.”229 As a result of these contributions, the French government may consider 
Frontex overly reliant on France. In February 2017, the French politician Jean-Marc 
Germain presented a report on the migratory situation to the French National Assembly. 
This report noted Frontex’s “excessive dependence on the member states” and the 
interoperability issues, but it also acknowledged the mission’s progress, emphasizing that 
it has “transformed into a true European Coast Guard and Border Guard, which is 
positive.”230  
A separate report presented by the French politician Pierre-Henri Dumont in 
October 2017 to the Assembly also offered positive remarks on Frontex’s operational 
development. However, this report stressed that France “be aware of the limits and the 
effectiveness of this policy” and that “the responsibility for the control of the external 
borders always lies with the Member States.”231 In short, although France acknowledges 
the benefits of a European border guard, France appears unwilling to rely on Frontex 
operations and consequently the operation has had minimal impact on French security 
perceptions and policies.  
Operation Themis operates under Italian command, but the government has also 
found the results suboptimal. In July 2017, the Italian Prime Minister, Paolo Gentiloni, 
criticized the EU and insisted that “Italy is reaching its limit…There needs to be burden 
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sharing; the migrants need to be brought to the ports of other countries as well.”232 
Additionally, Nicola Latorre, the Italian Senate Defense Committee Chairman, said, “soon 
enough, we won’t be able to handle it any longer…what can immediately be done, is to 
allow vessels that are not flying the Italian flag to carry those migrants to their respective 
countries.”233 These comments were directed at Italy’s primary issue with Triton. 
Specifically, the Italian government objected to the requirement that all migrants rescued 
at sea be taken to an Italian port, even if another EU country was closer. However, this 
requirement was removed when the operation was rebranded as Themis.234 Consequently, 
the operation may produce results that Italy finds more favorable and, therefore, Rome may 
be more willing to perceive the framework as beneficial to Italian national security.  
Spain, on the other hand, remains optimistic about Themis but desires greater 
collaboration between the member states. The Spanish 2016 Annual Security Review 
frequently underscored Spanish support and active “contributions to the international 
efforts in the central Mediterranean,” including Frontex operations.235 However, the 
security review suggested that there is room for improvement, and it conveyed Spanish 
desires for increased cooperation by “strengthening the channels of information exchange” 
between organizations.236 Moreover, in January 2018, Spanish Interior Minister Juan 
Ignacio Zoido called on the EU states to prioritize collaboration on the migrant crisis, 
explaining that in Spain’s experience the “agreements with third countries, the 
reinforcement of border control, and collaboration with Frontex” have been “very 
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effective.”237 Zoido’s perspective may, therefore, indicate that Spain not only considers 
Frontex an important instrument for national security but also holds that EU Mediterranean 
security support effectively assists Spain in meeting its border security objectives. 
In June 2015, the EU launched, within the Common Security and Defense Policy 
(CSDP) framework, European Union Naval Force Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED) to 
develop a wider EU response to the migrant crisis. In September 2015, it was renamed 
“Operation Sophia,” after a baby born aboard a German ship operating as part of the 
EUNAVFOR MED Task Force that rescued her mother. The operation’s mission is to 
“identify, capture, and dispose of vessels and enabling assets used or suspected of being 
used by migrant traffickers” and “to disrupt the business model of human smuggling and 
trafficking networks” in the Mediterranean.238 Although the operation has led to the arrest 
of 117 suspected smugglers, destroyed 491 boats, and rescued over 40,000 migrants, 
analysts have yet to determine a causal link between the operation and fluctuations in 
migrant flow numbers.239 Additionally, French analyst Thierry Tardy has pointed out that 
the instability in Libya and the absence of a strong government have “hindered the granting 
of formal consent to an EU presence in Libyan territorial waters,” which, in turn, is 
hampering the operation’s ability to carry out its mission.240  
The French government has in many ways expressed doubts about the effectiveness 
of Operation Sophia. In February 2017, Jean-Yves Le Drian, then the French Minister of 
Defense, disclosed that he found the results of the operation to be unsatisfactory and that 
despite the “heavy traffic between Benghazi and Misrata…no interception is possible” 
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because of the Libyan territorial water restrictions.241 Moreover, in October 2017, a French 
National Assembly report discussing Sophia did not attribute any decrease in migrant flows 
to the operation, pointing out that smugglers have adapted to the operation’s territorial 
limitations.242 Consequently, the French seem to view Operation Sophia as an operation 
that acts more like a search and rescue endeavor than an initiative that fully addresses 
national security concerns. 
Despite Operation Sophia’s evident limitations, the Italian government has 
demonstrated its commitment to the operation and its future prospects. In 2017, as part of 
Sophia, Italy trained members of the Libyan Coast Guard to strengthen efforts dismantling 
the smuggling networks.243 Italy perceives this training as an important step for security in 
the Mediterranean, as demonstrated by the 2017 Italian Strategy in the Mediterranean, 
which declares that “cooperation with Libyan authorities in the fight against human 
trafficking is increasingly effective.”244  
Additionally, it is noteworthy that in 2016 Italian Admiral Enrico Credendino, the 
Commander of Operation Sophia, provided testimony to the Italian Senate in which he 
drew comparisons between Sophia and the EU’s Operation Atalanta, a counter-piracy 
mission off the Horn of Africa. Specifically, he notes that Atalanta was expected to “last a 
year, but today it is in its seventh year,” and points out that even if Sophia could deter the 
smugglers, they would simply return once the operation ended, a circumstance that makes 
it unlikely Sophia would conclude after only one year.245 This suggests that the Italian 
government is well aware of the long-term implications of the Sophia mission. 
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Consequently, despite the mission’s constraints, Italy’s resolve to ensure the mission’s 
success indicates that Sophia is part of Italy’s long-term security strategy in the 
Mediterranean because it would significantly enhance Italian national security.  
Similarly, the Spanish government has expressed its commitment to Operation 
Sophia’s success. The 2016 Spanish Annual National Security Report shows that Spain 
“has supported the decision of the EU to add two additional tasks to Operation Sophia: 
…the implementation of the weapons embargo decreed by the United Nations Security 
Council, and providing training to the Libyan coast guard.”246 Additionally, in April 2017, 
the Spanish Minister of Defense, María Dolores de Cospedal, confirmed that Spain 
remained “very committed” to Operation Sophia and offered to relieve Italy by taking 
command of the EU operation.247 Spain reaffirmed its dedication not only by commanding 
Sophia from September through December 2017 but also by joining Italy in the training of 
the Libyan coast guard.248 Spanish policy and these actions suggest that Spain will continue 
fostering the development of Operation Sophia because Madrid considers it a step in the 
right direction toward addressing security concerns resulting from the migrant crisis. 
In 2008, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) was created as a multilateral 
Mediterranean initiative, largely advocated by Nicolas Sarkozy, then the French President. 
The UfM relaunched the Barcelona Process; and it is one of two regional components 
within the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), the other being the Eastern Partnership 
(EaP) that addresses Eastern Europe. According to the UfM website, its mission is “to 
enhance regional cooperation, dialogue, and the implementation of concrete projects and 
initiatives…. to address the three strategic objectives of the region: stability, human 
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development, and integration.” Additionally, it states that these “projects address areas 
such as economy, environment, energy, health, migration, education, and social affairs.”249 
Although leaders from the French, Italian, and Spanish governments have 
underscored its importance, the UfM has played an inconsequential role in their defense 
policies. In May 2017, the Spanish Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Illdefonso Castro 
López, granted that the UfM is “making progress in the integration, stability, and 
development” in the Euro-Mediterranean region.250 However, the 2017 National Security 
Strategy declares that “Spain supports revitalizing the southern dimension of the ENP,” a 
statement that indicates that Spain may not judge that the UfM is actually making progress, 
and, consequently, the UfM plays an insignificant role in Spanish policy.251 Leaders of the 
Italian and French governments have made similar statements of support, but the UfM is 
entirely absent from France’s 2017 Strategic Review of Defense and National Security and 
the 2017 Italian Strategy in the Mediterranean. Although it is possible that these Allies 
have left it out because the initiative fails to effectively address their major security 
concerns, it is more likely that they do not perceive the UfM as truly a security framework.  
If the Allies do not perceive the UfM as a security framework, it may be because it 
is too broad in scope. In February 2018, French President Emmanuel Macron alluded to 
this possibility in his speech delivered to the Tunisian government. Macron addressed 
Mediterranean security by noting that in the past, Mediterranean strategies have had visions 
that were “too broad” and “beyond us.” Accordingly, he proposed a “common strategy for 
the Mediterranean” and offered to host a “meeting of leaders” in France.252 Although some 
media observers have interpreted his remarks as a call to relaunch the UfM, there was no 
direct reference to this framework. The end result may be a new type of Mediterranean 
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initiative to address regional stability. However, it is not outside the realm of possibility 
that France will propose to narrow the scope of the UfM with a more precisely defined list 
of objectives.  
B. NATO INITIATIVES 
Despite the rapidly changing security environment in the Mediterranean, the 
Alliance has taken several steps to address the challenges at hand. However, its maritime 
strategy remains largely underdeveloped. In April 2017, NATO’s Allied Maritime 
Commander, Vice Admiral Clive Johnstone, drew attention to the Alliance’s need to adapt 
in the Mediterranean:  
So much has changed so quickly in maritime NATO that just about anything 
written about us more than three years ago is out of date. No one would 
have predicted that in 2014 that NATO warships would…help stop illegal 
migrant trafficking; or that we would have regular engagement with EU 
security actors like Frontex…Or that we would be facing Russian area 
denial networks in several areas, along with the return of the Russian Navy 
as a blue water force… Few would have predicted that Allied Maritime 
Command would become the coordinating hub for Alliance-wide 
surveillance of Russian naval activity.253  
Although his statement demonstrates that the Alliance is engaging in a variety of 
approaches to southern European and Mediterranean challenges, it also reveals that the 
Allies were unprepared for this dynamic environment. This possibility is further advanced 
when one considers the Alliance Maritime Strategy (AMS); it was last updated in 2011.254 
Even though the 2014 Wales Summit Declaration stated that the Alliance would “continue 
to intensify and expand our implementation of the Alliance Maritime Strategy,” observers 
have noted that this strategy is outdated and that it does not reflect the role of the Allied 
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maritime forces in this changed security environment.255 In short, although the Alliance is 
pursuing responses to the challenges of this new security environment, gaps remain, and 
the process of addressing the Southern Flank is far from complete.  
In response to Russian aggression, the Alliance has answered in the Mediterranean 
through exercises and other actions. At the 2014 Wales Summit, the Allies approved the 
Readiness Action Plan (RAP), a package of measures which, the NATO Allies asserted, 
are a “direct result of Russia’s aggressive actions to NATO’s east.” The plan affirms that 
to “provide assurance at sea NATO deploys a number of multinational maritime 
forces…patrolling the Baltic Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, and an enlarged Standing 
NATO Maritime Group conducting maritime assurance measures.”256 Additionally, a July 
2016 NATO fact sheet underscores that “over 100 of the nearly 300 exercises conducted 
in 2015 were in support of NATO’s assurance measures.”257 Although not all of these 
exercises were exclusively naval, many of them were or had a naval component, such as 
Exercise Trident Juncture 2015, which combined air, land, and maritime forces in the 
largest NATO exercise in over a decade.258 In short, France, Italy, and Spain have held key 
positions or have participated in many of these assurance measures, suggesting that these 
Allies support NATO measures to counter Russia’s Mediterranean presence. 
Another counter to Russia’s presence has been Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 
(SNMG2), NATO’s standing Mediterranean naval force. Noting the need to enhance the 
Alliance’s naval forces, the 2014 Wales Summit Declaration stated that the Alliance would 
“reinvigorate NATO’s Standing Naval Forces by making their…contributions more 
flexible and, in principle, no longer using them for protracted operations or for operations 
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with low-end tasks.”259 Although its tasks have ranged from participating in exercises to 
the shadowing and monitoring of Russian vessels in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, 
in 2016 SNMG2 deployed to the Aegean Sea for several months to support efforts against 
trafficking and illegal migration.260  
German analyst Andreas Jacobs points out that this deployment “raises the question 
whether NATO’s Aegean activity…might be considered by some member states” as a 
“low-end task.”261 Moreover, he reports that some observers “argue that patrolling the 
Aegean could challenge NATO’s Mediterranean posture against the backdrop of Russia’s 
enhanced naval capabilities in the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea.”262 While this 
may be true, SNMG2 has since resumed operations and exercises in the Mediterranean and 
the Black Sea.263 However, some observers maintain that SNMG2 cannot balance Russia’s 
naval presence. Turkish analyst Sinan Ülgen, for example, has argued that SNMG2 “is 
insufficiently set up to exercise sea control.”264  
As far as the Spanish perceptions of SNMG2’s tasks are concerned, Spain regards 
the Alliance naval group as a response to Russia’s presence. As previously noted, the 2016 
Annual Security Review points out that in response to Russia’s naval combat group in the 
Mediterranean, “NATO has reinforced its naval presence in the area through regular 
deployments, group exercises, and a permanent naval presence in the region.”265 While this 
does not fully indicate whether Spain perceives SNMG2 as a sufficient response to Russia’s 
presence, it does demonstrate that Spain perceives the naval group and its exercises as 
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counters to Russia’s Mediterranean posture. Additionally, the 2017 Spanish National 
Security Strategy shows that Spain “supports a higher profile for NATO in the south—an 
initiative that has been backed by the increase of NATO capabilities in the 
Mediterranean.”266 Accordingly, this statement suggests that Spain considers NATO’s 
Mediterranean presence as key to improving Mediterranean security and stability. 
Similarly, Italy regards NATO’s presence as necessary for Mediterranean security 
but also perceives SNMG2’s operations as an important step toward solving the migration 
crisis. The 2017 Italian Mediterranean Strategy notes that coordination between Frontex 
and SNMG2 “is a model that we are interested in developing to put the Mediterranean at 
the center of” NATO-EU cooperation.267 Additionally, the strategy asserts that NATO’s 
“strategic shift towards the south is still unfinished” and that Italy will “continue to work 
to ensure that the Alliance fully adapts to the new security needs, accelerating the 
completion of its ‘Framework for the South.’”268 Although NATO Secretary General Jens 
Stoltenberg has explained that this “Framework for the South” includes measures designed 
to support “defense and deterrence against any threat,” it is unclear how it will address 
Russia’s Mediterranean presence.269 Consequently, it is also uncertain whether and to what 
extent Italy perceives NATO’s Mediterranean presence as an effective balance to Russia’s 
Mediterranean presence. 
Although France may perceive SNMG2 as a counter to Russia’s naval presence, 
French leaders suggest that SNMG2 should play a role in the migration crisis. In July 2014, 
French Vice Admiral Christian Canova highlighted the recent SNMG2 deployments in the 
eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea and stated that “in the context of the Ukrainian 
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crisis, naval forces are a vehicle for affirming the determination of the collective.”270 
Accordingly, France perceives that SNMG2 demonstrates the Alliance’s will to uphold 
collective defense against Russian aggression. However, possibly as a result of increased 
migration pressures, in February 2016 France backed the initiative to send SNMG2 to the 
Aegean. In reference to this plan, Jean-Yves Le Drian stated that “we can no longer tolerate 
these networks that provide financial support for terrorist movements and we must strive 
to dismantle them…we have therefore largely supported this initiative.”271 In short, France 
may perceive SNMG2 as a tool for addressing immediate security concerns. 
NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) laid the foundation for security 
cooperation between NATO and specific Mediterranean countries. This multilateral 
initiative began with Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia in 1994, with Jordan 
and Algeria joining in 1995 and 2000, respectively.272 As David Yost has pointed out, even 
though the Dialogue allows these countries to determine their program involvement with 
the Alliance, the members “have also convened multilateral (NATO+7) meetings on a 
regular basis.”273 As a result, this partnership has evolved from simple dialogue to 
information sharing, training, and achieving interoperability through joint military 
exercises in the Mediterranean. Yost has pointed out that Dialogue partners contributed to 
NATO-led operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Libya. Moreover, he 
suggests that participation in MD activities, “notably those that address force 
interoperability, may well have facilitated these contributions to Alliance-led 
operations.”274 
Despite these accomplishments, some observers have suggested that the Dialogue 
is losing relevance among other cooperation initiatives and that it has failed to “establish a 
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minimum of policy convergence needed to prevent and manage crises.”275 Owing perhaps 
to the Dialogue’s suboptimal response to the recent crises in the Mediterranean, the 
initiative has had no apparent impact on French, Italian, and Spanish policies. The 
framework is not discussed in the 2017 Spanish National Security Strategy, the French 
2017 Strategic Review of Defense, or the 2017 Italian Strategy in the Mediterranean. 
Consequently, the absence of this initiative indicates that the MD may not adequately 
address any of their immediate security concerns. 
At the Warsaw Summit in July 2016, NATO introduced Operation Sea Guardian 
(OSG) as a joint Mediterranean security mission to replace the Article 5-based Operation 
Active Endeavour. While Operation Active Endeavour was an anti-terrorism support 
mission, OSG operates as a non-Article 5 initiative with a broader scope and three core 
missions: “maritime situational awareness, counter-terrorism, and maritime security 
capacity building.”276 According to Johnstone, Sea Guardian has “more robust rules of 
engagement” than Operation Active Endeavour had, and it uses resources and forces 
separate from SNMG2 so that “the Standing Naval Forces can remain focused on high-end 
training and rapid response.”277  
It is difficult to assess the French perspective on OSG. The 2015 French National 
Strategy for the Security of Maritime Areas emphasizes that France “promotes the 
collection and exchange of intelligence” because it “is essential to prevent attempts to carry 
out attacks.”278 Accordingly, the strategy highlights Operation Active Endeavour as an 
example of such collaboration. France’s 2017 Strategic Review, however, only alludes to 
OSG by pointing out that “NATO strengthens security in Europe’s southern approaches, 
and takes part (in particular by contributing naval assets) in the fight against terrorism and 
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other risks in the Mediterranean region.”279 Although this is not a direct reference to OSG, 
given that anti-terrorism is one of the operation’s core missions, it appears that France 
acknowledges that the operation plays a role when it comes to addressing French anti-
terrorism concerns. 
The 2017 Italian Strategy in the Mediterranean describes Sea Guardian as “further 
testimony of NATO’s role in the Mediterranean.”280 Additionally, it declares, “from the 
Italian perspective, the operation is particularly relevant as a testing ground for the 
cooperation between NATO and the European Union. Sea Guardian complements the 
European mission EU-NAVFORMED Sophia.”281 This indicates that Italy perceives Sea 
Guardian as part of the solution to the crises in the Mediterranean. Moreover, it suggests 
that Italy considers NATO a force multiplier for bolstering EU missions already addressing 
the migrant crisis. 
Similarly, Spain perceives OSG as a practical framework for enhancing 
Mediterranean security. In the Spanish 2016 Annual National Security Review, the 
document asserts that “Operation Sea Guardian contributions improve security in the 
Mediterranean.”282 Additionally, the review praises Sea Guardian’s role in NATO-EU 
cooperation by highlighting the fact that “Allied ships have successfully contributed to curb 
the irregular migratory flows across the Aegean, providing information to the EU 
(Frontex), Greece and Turkey.”283 Not only does this demonstrate Spain’s support for 
OSG, it also indicates that Spain values collaborative defense efforts and perceives them 
as an effective approach for Mediterranean security. Above all, it is evident that the core 
missions under OSG can support French, Italian, and Spanish security needs far beyond 
what Active Endeavour was able to offer, which is probably why these Allies maintain 
positive perceptions of this operation.  
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C. CONCLUSION 
While significant steps have been taken toward improving security and stability in 
the Mediterranean, France, Italy, and Spain continue to seek the right approach needed to 
address this dynamic environment. Although these Allies have shown support for all EU 
Mediterranean security cooperation initiatives, these frameworks have so far only provided 
sub-optimal solutions. As exemplified by Operation Sophia’s inability to target trafficking 
activities in Libya, these initiatives neither comprehensively address the underlying causes 
of instability nor are able to take the far-reaching actions necessary to exploit potential 
vulnerabilities. Consequently, although these initiatives are components of these Allies’ 
overall response to challenges in the South, the EU frameworks ultimately fall short of 
holistically assisting the management of security concerns unrelated to Russian 
Mediterranean activity.  
The southern Allies have long sought increased Alliance attention to the issues 
facing the southern flank. Although NATO has increased its presence and has demonstrated 
its willingness and capacity to respond to these challenges, the Southern allies maintain 
that NATO’s role should continue expanding. France and Spain recognize the key role of 
Alliance naval forces in countering Russia’s increased Mediterranean naval activity, but 
Italy’s perception regarding this role remains unclear. Above all, the southern Allies seek 
increased Alliance support to EU missions as they perceive that this enhances the 
effectiveness of EU frameworks. Although NATO’s support is a step toward a 
comprehensive approach to Mediterranean security, it does not significantly assist France, 
Italy, or Spain in the management of security priorities. Yet, these Allies embrace NATO 
and EU multilateral cooperation initiatives as positive developments toward their long-
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V. PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES 
Although France, Italy, and Spain have pursued policies and approaches that aim 
at creating a more secure and stable Mediterranean, their work is far from complete. Illegal 
trafficking, terrorism, and instability persist, without an end in sight. Meanwhile, Russia 
continues to take steps to expand its influence in the region, using both hard and soft power 
to achieve its objectives. This chapter analyzes three topics: Russia’s future Mediterranean 
activity, developments for France, Italy, and Spain, and prospects for NATO and EU 
multilateral initiatives. Each of these topics reveals that there are several challenges for 
both Russia and these Allies in the pursuit of their objectives.  
A. RUSSIA’S FUTURE MEDITERRANEAN ACTIVITY 
As Moscow seeks to expand Russian influence in the Mediterranean region, it will 
leverage all available means in order to achieve its strategic objective of great power status 
capable of asserting and protecting Russian interests. The growth of Russia’s footprint in 
the region will be gradual, but it could be limited as a result of an Alliance reaction. 
American analyst Dave Johnson has assessed that “Russia’s approach to conflict 
undeniably includes political, diplomatic, economic, non-linear and hybrid means below 
the level of armed conflict which can be employed in a gradual campaign, exploiting 
ambiguity to achieve strategic objectives without military violence.”284 Moreover, he has 
suggested that “the various diplomatic, economic, military, and subversive measures that 
have been employed by Russia in the Baltic Region and increasingly in the Balkans, Black 
Sea, and Mediterranean regions, could be interpreted as elements of a protracted campaign 
already underway.”285 All this indicates that Russia will play an ever-increasing role in the 
Mediterranean region by identifying developments of interest to Moscow and employing 
hard and soft power techniques to build its reputation as a significant Mediterranean player.  
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While an Alliance response could limit Russia’s Mediterranean footprint, the 
prospects of a serious reaction are doubtful. As long as the southern Allies remain 
preoccupied with the migrant crisis, terrorism, and trafficking, Russia can advance its 
regional interests and achieve short and long-term gains. As previously noted, Italian 
leaders have expressed hope that Moscow can help bring stability to the Mediterranean. 
This mindset allows Russia to exploit opportunities and pursue its regional objectives under 
the guise of pursuing a more stable Mediterranean. The possibility of an Alliance reaction 
to Russian behavior in the south is, therefore, lower than it otherwise might be, even when 
faced with worrisome trends. 
Some obstacles remain in Russia’s pursuit of establishing itself as a significant 
Mediterranean power and it would be a mistake to disregard them. Indeed, Johnson points 
out that “substantial institutional, systemic, and economic obstacles persist—and will be 
exacerbated by Crimea-related sanctions—but Russian military capabilities can be 
expected to improve gradually over the current planning and acquisition period to 2020.”286 
It is likely that Moscow’s ability to project power in the region will be limited in the 
following years as its aircraft carrier the Admiral Kuznetsov begins a modernization and 
overhaul process. As with the two-year refit in 1996, the modernization process that began 
in October 2017 is expected to take two to three years, but could last much longer.287 Franz-
Stefan Gady, a Russian military analyst, adds that due to recent budget cuts by the Russian 
Ministry of Defense, “the carrier’s electronic warfare, communication, intelligence, 
navigation, and combat control systems will likely not be undergoing modernization. Most 
work will be confined to the Kuznetsov flight deck and propulsion systems.”288 In short, in 
the next few years, the overhaul leaves Russia without the instrument that has been central 
to its power projection within the Mediterranean region.  
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Despite the temporary capability shortfall from the Kuznetsov overhaul, Russia is 
not completely without hard power in the Mediterranean. Russia can utilize its permanent 
naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean, particularly during times of crisis. This was 
most recently demonstrated in August 2018, when Russia began to build up its 
Mediterranean fleet in what has been called “the largest naval buildup since Russia entered 
the Syrian civil war in 2015.”289 The buildup is possibly intended to support Syrian 
President Bashar al-Assad in an assault on Syrian rebels, with the pro-Kremlin Izvestia 
newspaper reporting that the force “now includes 10 vessels, most of them armed with 
long-range Kalibr cruise missiles,” adding that more vessels are en route, including two 
submarines.290 Although the end result of the buildup remains to be seen, it demonstrates 
that even without the Kuznetsov, Russia is capable of boosting its hard power in situations 
that Moscow deems necessary.  
Russia has also shown that it is not entirely reliant on its hard power tools to expand 
its influence in the region. Moscow is seeking cooperative engagement with Egypt and 
other Middle Eastern and North African states to promote Russian interests in the region. 
In November 2017, Russia and Egypt reached a preliminary agreement that reportedly 
“would allow each country’s military to use the other’s air bases for a period of five years, 
which could be extended if agreed.”291 The fact that while visiting Cairo Russian Defense 
Minister Sergei Shoigu said that “we believe that it’s necessary to fight this evil [terrorism] 
together using all accessible means” shows that this cooperation process may not be limited 
to air forces.292 Additionally, in March 2018, the Russian government approved an 
agreement with Egypt to develop a Russian Industrial Zone in Egypt’s East Port Said that 
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is reportedly “expected to generate 35,000 jobs in a wide array of industries.”293 These 
diplomatic maneuvers could result in additional arrangements, including naval facility 
agreements under the pretense of greater security cooperation. 
Above all, the agreement with Cairo demonstrates Moscow’s cooperative 
engagement approach. This approach identifies security issues involving common ground 
between Russia and another state, and exploits that issue to foster bilateral ties. 
Consequently, Russia puts itself in a position to develop its regional influence, promote 
Russian interests, and extend its reach beyond the eastern Mediterranean. To illustrate, the 
agreement with Egypt extends Russia’s reach into other areas with cooperative engagement 
potential such as addressing the instability in Libya. By adopting this method, Russia can 
leverage its instruments of “soft power” such as foreign assistance or economic 
development investments while capitalizing on opportunities for cooperation. 
The cooperative engagement approach in the Mediterranean is increasingly 
apparent as Russia has sought to develop ties with Algeria and Morocco. In October 2017, 
Russia and Morocco signed cooperation agreements in military, security, and economic 
areas. The Russian Prime Minister, Dimitry Medvedev, stated that the agreement includes 
“deliveries of Russian military products to Morocco.”294 Furthermore, in February 2018, 
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met with Algerian officials to identify agreements 
that “emphasize military cooperation between the two countries in the fight against 
terrorism.”295 Although the cooperation agreements with Algeria and Morocco do not 
necessarily suggest that Russia has a strong foothold in these states, nor are they as 
extensive as the cooperation agreements with Egypt, they nevertheless demonstrate the 
steps Russia is taking to deepen its relationships with these Mediterranean states. 
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As some of the aforementioned agreements show, Russia’s cooperative 
engagement is not limited to security issues, but extends to economic, diplomatic, and 
military matters. This type of engagement has been particularly visible in Libya. Moscow 
has much to gain through engagement with Libya. In 2017, the Russian oil company 
Rosneft signed a crude offtake agreement with Libya’s National Oil Corporation.296 
Nikolay Kozhanov, a Russian expert, notes that “if Russian companies obtain access to the 
region’s resources” through this agreement and other energy cooperation agreements with 
Syria, “the additional supply would strengthen Russia’s presence in the global energy 
market.”297 In other words, Russia has vested interests in Libya’s success as this would 
tighten Moscow’s grip on the region’s energy supply. Anna Borshchevskaya, an expert on 
Russia, observes that the Rosneft deal “serves as an indication that Moscow could use 
Rosneft as one of its foreign policy tools in a geopolitically shaped southern Mediterranean 
region.”298  
Libya also provides military and diplomatic opportunities for Moscow. 
Borschevskaya highlights that “in 2008, Moscow discussed the possibility of setting up a 
naval base in Benghazi with the Qaddafi regime to counter-balance U.S. interests in 
Africa.”299 Although this development did not materialize, the possibility demonstrates one 
of the many ways in which Moscow can gain through cooperative engagement with Libya. 
However, the ongoing conflicts and instability in Libya imply that Russia would need to 
take diplomatic steps to make its aims possible. Indeed, these steps are increasingly 
evident. As Borshchevskaya has pointed out, in Libya “Russian diplomats often signal that 
they would like to participate in a settlement there, whether alone or officially under UN 
                                                 
296 Nikolay Kozhanov, Russian Policy Across the Middle East: Motivations and Methods, (London: 
Chatham House, 2018), 18, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/russian-policy-across-middle-east-
motivations-and-methods. 
297 Kozhanov, Russian Policy Across the Middle East, 18. 
298 Anna Borshchevskaya and Mohamed Eljarh, Russia in the Mediterranean: Strategies and 
Aspirations, Mediterranean Dialogue Series: No. 12 (Tunis, Tunisia: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 
Mediterranean Advisory Group, 2018), 6, http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_51249-1522-1-
30.pdf?180108134446. 
299 Borshchevskaya and Eljarh, Russia in the Mediterranean, 6. 
84 
auspices.”300 Borshchevskaya explains that “Putin might be interested in bolstering his 
diplomatic credentials and facilitating his role as a peace-maker in Libya as well as fixer 
of the West’s perceived mistakes and failures.”301 In short, engagement in Libya could 
prospectively put Russia in a strengthened position in relation to the West. 
These developments in cooperative engagement and economic investments could 
do two things for Russia’s strategic position in the Mediterranean. First, they could enhance 
Russia’s future standing by building strong relationships and, if effective in these 
engagements, possibly constructing a reputation as a guarantor of Mediterranean security. 
By finding common ground with states on security, economic, and political issues, Moscow 
portrays itself as a regional partner, establishing a positive reputation among the Middle 
Eastern and North African states. Accordingly, Russia improves its status by gaining 
relationships of strategic value that can be leveraged against the West. Second, these 
engagements could provide the opportunity for Russia to expand its influence and assert 
itself in the region as a great power capable of promoting its strategic interests. Behind the 
mask of security cooperation, Russia could ultimately advance its position to the point 
where it could pursue its objectives and directly challenge NATO forces in the region at 
any given moment. By exploiting these cooperative arrangements, Russia has expanded 
the scope of its Mediterranean activities beyond any previous point in the post-Cold War 
period. Thus, Russia is taking important steps to establish itself as a major Mediterranean 
player that is increasingly capable of expanding its influence and countering the West. 
B. FRANCE, ITALY, AND SPAIN 
As demonstrated in Chapter III, French, Italian, and Spanish policies aim for a 
secure and stable Mediterranean. When considering long-term security implications and 
future trends for the region, it is necessary to analyze the approaches and steps that France, 
Italy and Spain are taking toward this objective. Analysis of these developments may throw 
                                                 
300 Anna Borshchevskaya, “The Kremlin’s Middle East Gambit,” The Washington Institute for Near 
East Policy, April 10, 2018, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-kremlins-
middle-east-gambit. 
301 Borshchevskaya and Eljarh, Russia in the Mediterranean, 6. 
85 
light on future prospects for Mediterranean security and clarify what effect, if any, these 
efforts might have on Russia’s Mediterranean influence.  
It is possible that through continued economic and social development in the region, 
France, Italy, and Spain will indirectly challenge Russia’s attempts to expand its influence. 
Through several frameworks, these Allies have all shown commitment to regional 
development to improve security and stability in the Mediterranean. To illustrate, in August 
2017, a summit including Heads of State and Government from France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain, Niger, Chad, and the Chairman of the Presidential Council of Libya met to discuss 
the challenges facing the Mediterranean, particularly migration, smuggling, and 
trafficking, and the root causes driving these challenges. These countries agreed on several 
actions to be taken in the economic, social, and security realms to address these challenges. 
These actions included: enhancing “economic cooperation with communities along 
migration routes in Libya, with the aim to creating alternative resources of 
income…making them independent of human trafficking,” “providing alternative 
economic growth models,” “strengthening the implementation of the Regional 
Development and Protection Plan for North Africa,” “stepping up security measures and 
measures combating human, drug, and arms trafficking,” and strengthening cooperation 
with Morocco, Mauritania, and Algeria in the fight against migrant smuggler networks.302  
Although it remains to be seen if this multipronged approach and other attempts to 
foster stability in North Africa will produce the desired results, they may be enough to 
outstrip or at least counter some of Russia’s growing influence in the region. The challenge 
for France, Italy, and Spain is that they must continue to match or exceed Russia’s 
economic and security cooperation support to the region.  
Bobo Lo has argued that “economic means are considerably more effective in 
projecting power than military might.”303 In his view, Russia’s investments in the post-
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Soviet space have encouraged “its neighbors to diversify their external relations at the same 
time as maintaining parasitic ties to Moscow.”304 Similar parallels can be drawn to Russia’s 
engagement with Mediterranean states. On the one hand, the Middle Eastern and North 
African countries will be receptive to economic investment and assistance from Russia, 
which will thereby gain a high degree of influence. As Borshchevskaya and Mohamed 
Eljarh observe, “many MENA countries are looking to diversify their economies and 
political relationships. Russia provides an important diversification opportunity, beyond 
simply signaling to the West that they have other options.”305 At the same time, these states 
would likely maintain some “parasitic” ties with European states in order to improve their 
economic performance and their own global standing. However, this outcome hinges on 
Russia’s ability to maintain these ties, which may prove costly during periods of severe 
economic slowdown, limiting the Kremlin’s overall influence.  
On the other hand, MENA countries may be more receptive to European 
cooperation and remain cautious about embracing Moscow’s support. This outcome would 
shore up European influence in the area, and these states may perceive Russia’s support as 
an added bonus. Russia will have then gained some influence, but not enough to outmatch 
the other European states. Either possibility raises the prospect of a more stable and secure 
Mediterranean region, which would ultimately make France, Italy, and Spain more 
attentive to Russia’s Mediterranean activity. 
However, given Russia’s expansion at Syria’s Tartus Naval Base, increased 
Mediterranean submarine activity, the refitting of the Kuznetsov aircraft carrier, and other 
developments, these Allies still face the challenge of Russia’s instruments of hard power 
in the Mediterranean. As previously mentioned in Chapter III, the Italian Navy has taken 
steps to upgrade its fleet. Similarly, France has recently taken steps to improve its fleet 
including: receiving its fifth of eight planned FREMM multi-mission frigates, purchasing 
six new generation Barracuda-class nuclear attack submarines to replace its six Rubis-class 
submarines, and acquiring five new Belharra-class frigates to replace the La Fayette-class 
                                                 
304 Lo, Russia and the New World Disorder, 58. 
305 Borshchevskaya and Eljarh, Russia in the Mediterranean, 1. 
87 
frigates.306 Spain is also upgrading its fleet with the purchase of F110-class frigates to 
replace its six Santa Maria-class frigates and the current construction of S-80 class 
submarines.307 While these developments do not necessarily suggest that these Allies’ 
navies alone can balance Russia’s naval power, they do show that France, Italy, and Spain 
are taking measures to develop their maritime capabilities. 
However, will these Allies maintain the required degree of naval readiness that can 
contain Russia’s Mediterranean ambitions? Jeremy Stöhs, an Austrian-American defense 
analyst, points out that most European “navies have excelled at conducting operations at 
the lower end of the intensity spectrum and within largely permissive environments” but 
“traditional war-fighting capabilities (e.g., ASW and ASuW) against near-peer competitors 
have atrophied severely in the quarter century since the end of the Cold War.”308 Indeed, 
in the post-Cold War period, France, Italy, and Spain have generally focused their attention 
on non-conventional operations such as countering terrorism and preventing trafficking. 
But these Allies have also taken steps to recover their long-neglected traditional maritime 
war-fighting skills, particularly through Alliance exercises such as NATO’s annual 
submarine warfare exercise DYNAMIC MANTA.309 Exercises such as these not only 
strengthen the French, Italian, and Spanish conventional war-fighting skills but also 
improve interoperability between the several fleets in the Alliance, which is essential for 
dealing with the Russian Mediterranean threat. Ultimately, the challenge for these Allies is 
continually working toward a high state of readiness and continuing to develop fleets that 
are capable of countering Russia’s Navy at any given moment.  
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C. NATO AND THE EU 
The importance of multilateral cooperation initiatives to the future of 
Mediterranean security and stability should not be neglected. As argued in Chapter IV, 
although France, Italy, and Spain have demonstrated their commitment to these initiatives, 
they perceive the EU frameworks as suboptimal for comprehensively addressing the 
migrant crisis, and they call for an expanded NATO role in the southern flank. To achieve 
a secure Mediterranean, challenges facing both NATO and the EU need to be addressed. 
Even though NATO has responded to the southern Allies’ calls by taking some 
steps to strengthen its southern approach, the biggest challenge for the organization is 
adapting, prioritizing, and comprehensively engaging in this ever-changing environment. 
Scholars Ian Lesser, Charlotte Brandsma, and others have argued that “adapting the 
Alliance to meet the diverse risks across a 4,000-mile land and sea flank is essential if 
NATO is to remain relevant.”310 They also point out that “lacking is an overall strategy and 
a set of concepts to deal with the multifaceted challenges in the south. Indeed, it is unclear 
that a unified strategy of this kind is possible given the sheer diversity of risks.”311 While 
these scholars offer some solutions for the Alliance to consider, the overarching necessity 
is that the Alliance continue to minimize the gap between the southern and eastern flanks. 
If there is less disconnect between the two flanks, it will increase the prospects for balanced 
solutions. 
Increased Russian aggression combined with expanded Russian Mediterranean 
activity may help bridge this gap. Lesser, Brandsma and others hold that “the growth of 
the Russia factor in the south is an additional source of risk, including the risk of an 
accidental clash, but may also prove a unifying element across NATO’s geography.”312 
Indeed, it has become increasingly apparent to France, Italy, and Spain that Russia’s 
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activity is no longer limited to the eastern flank, and these three Allies contribute to several 
assurance measures on the eastern flank.313 Similarly, the eastern Allies should recognize 
that Russia has expanded its activities in the south. By showing further support to the 
southern Allies, the eastern Allies will not only be demonstrating assurance to the south 
regarding some of Europe’s most immediate security challenges, but they will also be 
showing solidarity and thus reinforcing the credibility of the Article 5 commitment. In 
other words, demonstrating Alliance unity in both the east and the south would be a positive 
step for simultaneously addressing concerns on both flanks.  
As NATO-EU cooperation in the south develops and intensifies, there may be more 
opportunities to collaborate and effectively respond to developing challenges. Lesser and 
Bradsma note that “with the EU-NATO Joint Declaration of July 2016, both institutions 
agreed to strengthen their operational cooperation” and that this “creates a framework for 
NATO and the EU to work together to build defense and security capacity, and to enhance 
the security of their partners in the region, through specific projects in a variety of areas 
for individual countries.”314 In discussing the NATO-EU shared vision and cooperation in 
the Balkans, David Yost has pointed out that this type of cooperation has “been of 
significant value for the member states of both organizations.”315 If these two organizations 
can develop a shared vision and strategy for the Mediterranean, one that leverages their 
strengths, it would be largely beneficial for both organizations and their member states. 
The southern Allies strongly favor increased EU-NATO collaboration, and this would be 
a positive development toward that aim. One of the greatest challenges facing this 
cooperation, however, is that “serious difficulties have hampered their relations: 
institutional and national rivalries, the participation problem, and disagreements about the 
proper scope and purpose of NATO-EU cooperation.”316 Accordingly, NATO-EU 
cooperation in the Mediterranean may face an uphill battle in the coming years as these 
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organizations and their member states develop a comprehensive approach to bring stability 
and security to the south. 
Despite the progress and successes of EU multilateral cooperation initiatives in the 
Mediterranean (including Operation Sophia, Operation Themis, and Union for the 
Mediterranean), these operations will also continue to face various challenges in the 
coming years in order to be considered effective by France, Italy, and Spain. Operation 
Sophia will need to improve its strategy and act less like a search and rescue mission, and 
more like a mission that deters and defeats traffickers and smugglers. In July 2018, Italy 
threatened to close its ports to intercepted migrants, demanding that the migrants be 
distributed evenly throughout the European Union or be brought back to Libya by the 
Libyan coastguard.317 If this operation does not take further steps to improve security for 
the southern Allies, they may shift their support and resources toward alternative solutions 
to the growing crisis. Operation Themis and the Union for the Mediterranean may also be 
in danger of losing their support from the southern Allies if they continue to be perceived 
as inadequate for addressing Mediterranean security issues. In short, unless these EU 
initiatives begin to address the underlying causes of instability, they are unlikely to produce 
the desired results.  
D. CONCLUSION 
As France, Italy, and Spain develop policies and approaches to create a more stable 
and secure Mediterranean, they will have to deal with the prospect of Russia’s ever-
increasing influence in the region. Russia will employ both hard and soft power instruments 
in order to leverage perceived opportunities to expand its regional influence. Through 
economic and security cooperation, Russia is enhancing its future standing and building a 
positive reputation among Middle Eastern and North African states. While French, Italian, 
and Spanish socio-economic contributions to these areas may serve to reduce Russia’s 
influence, the challenge for these Allies will remain. Although NATO and the EU have 
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deepened their cooperation in the region, without a shared vision and strategy for the 
Mediterranean, they may fall short of their ambitions. Above all, Russia’s Mediterranean 
activity may help bridge the Alliance’s the eastern-southern flank gap, producing 








The key objective of Soviet Mediterranean policy was to establish a permanent 
naval presence that was capable of countering the West. Despite the Soviet Navy’s relative 
inexperience and considerable logistic obstacles, the Soviets took steps toward the 
achievement of this goal by establishing a military foothold in the region. Despite this 
accomplishment, however, the scope of the Soviet Union’s Mediterranean activity 
remained limited without shore-based naval support facilities. Cultivating relationships 
with Middle Eastern and North African states delivered a solution to this problem, 
providing the Soviets with the facilities required to expand their naval operations. Among 
these relationships, Russia’s ties with Syria became one of the most important for 
maintaining a permanent Mediterranean presence during and especially after the Cold War. 
Although the naval force did not entirely reduce Western influence in the region, it 
nonetheless presented a challenge to the West; and it advanced Russia’s wider foreign 
policy objectives. In sum, the Soviet phase laid the foundations for Russia’s post-Cold War 
Mediterranean activities. 
While the post-Cold War security environment in the Mediterranean has changed, 
Russia’s geopolitical ambitions in the region have remained the same. The development of 
policies aimed at expanding influence in the region has demonstrated that the 
Mediterranean remains key to achieving Russia’s strategic objectives of great power status, 
with Moscow capable of asserting and protecting Russia’s interests in the region. To that 
end, 2008 marked the beginning of a new phase in Soviet Mediterranean naval activity. In 
the following years, the Russian Navy carried out multiple deployments, took steps toward 
modernization, and ultimately demonstrated its ability to execute combat operations in 
Syria, gaining valuable experience in this environment. At the same time, Russia has flexed 
its instruments of soft power in the Mediterranean, pursuing a cooperative engagement 
strategy that has allowed Moscow to exploit opportunities, cultivate relationships, and 
promote its regional influence.  
As Russia continues its aggressive military and geopolitical posturing, NATO faces 
a southern flank threat that cannot be ignored. However, as the perceptions and policies of 
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France, Italy, and Spain have demonstrated, there is a difference between recognizing a 
potential security threat and prioritizing it as a pressing national security concern.  
While it is evident that the perceptions of France, Italy, and Spain have shifted to 
recognize that Russia’s Mediterranean naval presence represents an emerging security 
challenge that deserves more attention, their policy shifts have not in every way been the 
same. Moreover, as previously noted, the shifts in perception do not fully correlate with 
Russia’s expanded Mediterranean naval activity, but instead, greater attention to this 
challenge has been consistent with the rising visibility of Russian military aggression. In 
response to this increased aggression, France, Italy, and Spain have recognized that Russia 
is not a threat limited to the Alliance’s eastern flank, and they have reaffirmed their 
collective defense commitments by strengthening their support to NATO assurance 
measures. As southern flank border states that are directly exposed to the instability and 
nontraditional threats emanating from the Middle East and North Africa, the greatest 
challenge for these Allies is finding a way to balance their strategic priorities without 
neglecting either immediate security threats or long-term national security concerns.  
French perceptions and policies regarding Russia’s Mediterranean activity appear 
to have changed the most. While the 2013 French White paper made no direct reference to 
Russia’s Mediterranean activity, the 2017 Defense and National Security Strategic Review 
placed a new emphasis on Russia’s aggressive behavior, including Russia’s Mediterranean 
sea and air power demonstrations. However, this change did not happen overnight. 
Increased Russian aggression, particularly in Crimea and Syria, drew the attention of 
policymakers who reassessed the Russian threat. French policymakers have increasingly 
been open on this perspective shift and have made statements denouncing Russian 
aggression and Mediterranean activity. While concerns regarding threats resulting from 
instability in North Africa and the Middle East remain, France explicitly recognizes that 
the Russian threat is genuine. 
In contrast, Italy has remained reluctant to label Russia’s Mediterranean activity a 
threat in any written policy. However, this has also been paralleled by increased Italian 
support to NATO assurance measures on the eastern flank, calls from Italian naval leaders 
to prepare for conventional naval warfare, and statements directly recognizing that Russia 
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is now a Mediterranean power. The reluctance to label Russia a threat mostly stems from 
Italian desires to restore stability in the Mediterranean. This is why some Italian 
policymakers have called on Russia to play a greater and more constructive role in restoring 
Mediterranean stability. Italy is arguably the most affected of the three NATO states by the 
dynamics of Middle Eastern and North African instability, and therefore Rome perceives 
this as a much more urgent concern than the potential long-term threat posed by Russia 
along the southern flank. 
Spain emerges between France and Italy regarding its perceptions and policies. On 
the one hand, Spanish policy documents show that Spain openly shares French concerns 
about Russia’s aggression and Mediterranean activity and considers a multilateral response 
necessary to address this challenge. Although research was unable to discover any 
statements by policy makers denouncing Russian Mediterranean activity, the shift in 
Spanish policies is evident. On the other hand, Spain remains sensitive to Russian 
perceptions and recognizes that constructive dialogue with Russia is crucial. However, 
despite the criticism Spain received from fellow Allies for initially permitting Russian 
warships to dock at Ceuta, Spain has demonstrated that it holds its commitments to NATO 
and the EU in higher regard than its relations with Russia. 
Multilateral cooperation initiatives could provide some relief to these Allies by 
effectively addressing areas of concern in their strategic security priorities. However, the 
EU initiatives fall short of French, Italian, and Spanish expectations, providing little relief 
to what these Allies view as their most immediate security concerns. Although the NATO 
initiatives in the southern flank are perceived as positive developments by France, Italy, 
and Spain, these three Allies also consider NATO’s response underdeveloped, and they 
maintain that the organization should continue expanding its engagement activities within 
the region. Additionally, it is apparent that France and Spain recognize that Alliance naval 
forces are integral to countering Russia’s increased Mediterranean naval activity. In 
contrast, as discussed in Chapter III, Italy believes that Russia could play a role in 
promoting Mediterranean security and stability. Despite these perceived shortcomings of 
the EU and NATO initiatives, they remain important elements of these Allies’ overall 
response to the challenges in the south.  
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As Russia continues to expand its influence throughout the Mediterranean region, 
France, Italy, and Spain risk losing sight of this long-term challenge by over-committing 
themselves to resolving the crises resulting from Middle Eastern and North African 
instability. While recognizing Russia’s expanding Mediterranean presence as a potential 
threat may make these Allies more cognizant of Russia’s activities in the region, it is 
essential that these Allies continue to recognize the fact that Russia poses a direct challenge 
to the Alliance in the Mediterranean. Despite their emphasis on immediate security 
challenges in the Mediterranean, these Allies must develop an approach to judiciously 
manage their strategic priorities. By finding a balance between actively preparing for and 
responding to developments in Russia’s Mediterranean activity, as well as developing a 
holistic strategy that responds to North African and Middle Eastern instability, these Allies 
may foster the conditions necessary for a more secure and stable Mediterranean region. 
Above all, demonstrating Alliance unity with the eastern flank is one of the most important 
steps these Allies can take in response to Russia’s behavior in the south. Without this unity, 
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